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Vincent R. Johnson* 
I.  A SCANDALOUS SITUATION 
Tom C. Clark served at the pinnacles of the American legal profession 
for nearly a quarter of a century as Attorney General from 1945 to 19491 
  
 * Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, 
Texas.  B.A. and LL.D., St. Vincent College (Pa.); J.D., University of Notre Dame; LL.M., Yale Univer-
sity.  Dean Johnson has served as a Fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States, a Fulbright 
Scholar in China and Romania, and a lecturer in the legal ethics program of the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Asia Law Initiative in Mongolia.  He is a member of the American Law Institute. 
  Preparation of this Article was assisted by St. Mary’s University law students Daniel Austin 
Ortiz, Jacqueline F. Dieterle, Armistead M. Long, Teresa Ahnberg, Patricia Zarate, and Benjamin Carba-
jal.  At the University of Texas School of Law, Michael Widener, head of special collections at the 
Tarlton Law Library, graciously facilitated access for the author to the papers of Justice Clark. 
 1. See Larry Temple, Mr. Justice Clark:  A Tribute, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 271, 272 (1977).  According 
to Temple: 
[As Attorney General, Tom Clark] was instrumental in using that position to urge and secure 
the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act—establishing an orderly, fair, and 
legally understandable system for the operation of federal governmental agencies.  The prog-
eny of that act can now be found in the administrative procedure acts which have been 
adopted in most of the states of the Union. 
Id. at 272.  As the nation’s top law enforcement officer, 
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and Supreme Court Justice from 1949 to 1967.2  He filed the first amicus 
curiae brief for the United States in a civil rights case,3 and he wrote deci-
sions that are true landmarks in the jurisprudence of criminal law4 and 
church-state relations.5  Yet it is arguable that Justice Clark’s greatest con-
tribution to the shaping of a field of law was made after he left the Court in 
1967, when his son Ramsey was appointed Attorney General by Lyndon B. 
Johnson.6  During that ten-year period of robust professional activity,7 Jus-
  
Clark was active in promoting the government’s “loyalty program” during the beginning of 
the cold-war period, and was the first compiler of the then famous “Attorney General’s list” 
of subversive organizations.  He argued several cases before the Supreme Court during his 
tenure as attorney general, and his nomination by Truman to the vacancy in 1949 came as no 
surprise.  Clark’s nomination was opposed in the Senate by liberals who disliked his support 
of the government’s loyalty program, but he was confirmed with little difficulty. 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:  HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 88 (1987). 
 2. As a Justice, Clark had the courage to vote against the President who appointed him in the 
landmark Steel Seizure case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (con-
curring in the judgment)).  “Clark was regarded as a staunch supporter of the government in all matters, 
and was considered a part of the Court’s conservative wing.”  REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 35.  See 
generally Dennis D. Dorin, Tom C. Clark, the Justice as Administrator, 61 JUDICATURE 271, 271–77 
(1978) (discussing Justice Clark’s confirmation and judicial philosophy, and stating that “[n]o one ever 
gave more of himself” to the cause of effective judicial administration). 
According to Justice William O. Douglas: 
Most of the Truman appointees [including Clark] reflected the small-town attitudes of con-
formity more than the emerging urban consciousness of the need for diversity.  Tom Clark 
was different in the sense that he changed.  He had the indispensable capacity to develop so 
that with the passage of time he grew in stature and expanded his dimensions. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS:  1939-1975:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS 245 (1980).  “In my time, Tom Clark probably contributed more insight into antitrust prob-
lems than any other Justice.”  Id. at 162. 
 3. Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, “Tom Clark is . . . to be remembered as the first attorney 
general of the United States to file a brief amicus curiae in a civil rights case.  In 1948 he ordered the 
filing of a brief in support of the Negroes in the restrictive covenant cases.”  Justice Clark Dies, 63 
A.B.A. J. 984, 985 (1977). 
 4. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring exclusion of evidence obtained by an 
unconstitutional search).  Virtually all of the law review articles dealing with Justice Clark during the 
past score years have related to his criminal law jurisprudence.  See Dennis D. Dorin, Marshaling Mapp: 
Justice Tom Clark's Role in Mapp v. Ohio's Extension of the Exclusionary Rule to State Searches and 
Seizures, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401 (2001) (celebrating the 40th anniversary of the decision); Paul R. 
Baier, Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the Exclusionary Rule, 64 TEX. L. REV. 415, 419 (1985) 
(stating that “Tom Clark's voice speaks to us still of wisdom and common sense in the administration of 
justice”); Mark Srere, Note, Justice Tom C. Clark's Unconditional Approach to Individual Rights in the 
Courtroom, 64 TEX. L. REV. 421 (1985) (discussing opinions by Justice Clark involving the right to a 
fair trial). 
 5. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that com-
pulsory Bible reading and prayer recitation in public schools is unconstitutional). 
 6. Writing of Justice Clark’s retirement from the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated: 
No other retirement in the long history of the Court was occasioned by such a felicitous cir-
cumstance.  To retire because one’s son had been appointed Attorney General of the United 
States, and thus a litigant in half of all the cases that reach the Supreme Court, is a reason that 
would warm the heart of any Justice . . . . 
Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Clark:  A Tribute, 46 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1967). 
 7. Justice Clark had also led a hectic life while serving on the Court.  See John P. Frank, Justice 
Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 TEX. L. REV. 5, 5–6 (1967) (describing a four-and-a-half day 
period in 1963 when Justice Clark “had 32 scheduled engagements, . . . made several substantial 
speeches . . . [and] visited with hundreds of persons from all over the country, an astonishingly large 
number of whom he knew”). 
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tice Clark served as the first Director of the Federal Judicial Center,8 headed 
the implementation of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,9 chaired the 
newly created Supreme Court Fellows Program,10 sat as an appellate judge 
on every federal circuit,11 and even tried cases as a federal trial judge.12  
Most importantly, as an ex-Justice, Clark lent his considerable talent, pres-
tige, and energy to the work of the American Bar Association Special 
Committee (now known as the “Clark Committee”) which conducted a 
thorough review of lawyer discipline.13  That Committee issued a report (the 
“Clark Report” or “Report”)14 that proved transformative in its effect.  The 
Report was the starting point in a revolution which, over ensuing decades, 
has wholly reshaped the field of legal ethics.15  Except perhaps for Justice 
  
 8. In March 1968, Justice Clark was named the first Director of the newly created Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC), a research and training center for issues affecting the federal courts.  See Tom C. Clark, 
The New Federal Judicial Center, 54 A.B.A. J. 743 (1968) (discussing the creation of the center); Tom 
C. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 53 JUDICATURE 99, 101–03 (Oct. 1969) (discussing studies and 
training programs conducted by the center).  Clark served until he retired at age 70 (in 1969) as required 
by statute.  See Tom C. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 538 (noting that the 
center had become the “most prestigious ‘judges school’ in the world”). 
            President Lyndon Johnson, “at the suggestion of the Judicial Conference of the United States,” 
had urged Congress to establish the Center.  Tom C. Clark, Justice—Truth in Action, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
419, 426 (1968).  Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark had been supporters of the project.  See Tem-
ple, supra note 1, at 273 (stating that “[f]ollowing his retirement from the Court, Justice Clark, along 
with Chief Justice Earl Warren, established the Federal Judicial Center”); Mimi Clark Grundland, Asso-
ciate Justice Tom C. Clark:  A Centennial Celebration, Vol. XX, No. 3 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. Q. 6 (1999) 
(stating that Clark had been a major advocate for the Center, which was established by Congress for the 
purpose of modernizing the federal court system). 
            Originally based in the Dolly Madison House on Lafayette Square across from the White House, 
a highly prestigious address, the FJC is now housed in more spacious quarters in the Thurgood Marshall 
Federal Judiciary Building near Union Station, a short walk from the Supreme Court.  The Center con-
tinues to research issues of concern to the federal court system and provide training for federal judges. 
 9. See Tom C. Clark, The Implementation Story—Where We Must Go, 55 JUDICATURE 383, 383 
(1972) (stating that beginning in 1968, Justice Clark chaired the committee). 
 10. “In 1974, Chief Justice [Warren] Burger appointed . . . Clark the first chair of the Supreme 
Court Fellows Commission [originally called the Judicial Fellows Commission].”  THE SUPREME COURT 
FELLOWS PROGRAM 2004-2005 at 9 (brochure).  Currently, four Fellows are selected each year:  one to 
work in the office of the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, one for the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter, one for the Administrative Office of United States Courts, and one for the Federal Sentencing Com-
mission.  “Each year, in recognition of the Justice=s interest in the program, one of the Supreme Court 
fellows is presented with the Tom C. Clark Award.”  Id. at 9–10.  
 11. See Temple, supra note 1, at 273 (stating that Justice Clark “was understandably proud of the 
fact that he was the only judge ever to sit on all of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals”). 
 12. Id. (stating that Justice Clark sat as a trial judge). 
 13. Justice Clark actually began his work on the ABA Special Committee before leaving the Su-
preme Court.  See Justice Tom C. Clark to Chair ABA Committee Which Will Evaluate Bar Discipline, 
12 AM. B. NEWS, Apr. 1967, at 1 (stating both that Justice Clark would chair the Committee and that he 
had announced his retirement from the Supreme Court because of the appointment of his son as Attorney 
General).  “The retirement date has not been announced but is expected to be prior to the convening of 
the fall court term.”  Id.  Justice Clark left the Supreme Court on June 12, 1967.  JERRY GOLDMAN, TOM 
C. CLARK, at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/86/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 14. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]. 
 15. Some might argue that the starting point for the revolution in legal ethics was the ABA=s prom-
ulgation of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, rather than the issuance of the Clark 
Report in 1970.  The contributions of the Code and its drafters should not be minimized.  See Vincent R. 
Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
25, 43 (2000) (opining that the Code was “really quite useful” in terms of embracing both aspirational 
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Clark’s majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,16 which held that evidence ob-
tained by an unconstitutional search is inadmissible in a criminal proceed-
ing, arguably nothing he did led so thoroughly to the reconfiguration of an 
area of law as his leadership in the field of lawyer accountability. 
Thirty-five years after being issued, the Clark Report still reads as a 
powerful document unequivocally calling for integrity in the legal profes-
sion.  With straight-forward language and clear prescriptions, the Report, 
released in 1970, indicted American lawyer disciplinary systems for their 
many deficiencies.  Officially named the Special Committee on Evaluation 
of Disciplinary Enforcement,17 the Committee, headed by former Supreme 
Court Justice Tom C. Clark, called in its Report for prompt and widespread 
reforms.  In no uncertain terms, the Report announced, in words that have 
often been repeated: 
After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the coun-
try, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous situa-
tion that requires the immediate attention of the profession.  With 
few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward discipli-
nary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility.  Disci-
plinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions; prac-
tices and procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary agencies 
have little power to take effective steps against malefactors.18 
The Clark Committee expressed both shock at the numerous weak-
nesses in state disciplinary regimes as well as confidence that the systems 
could be fixed.  The shock was to some extent feigned, for Justice Clark=s 
personal files show that the Committee had searched for “horribles” that 
could be used to dramatize deficiencies in lawyer discipline.19  The Com-
mittee’s feint notwithstanding, in August 1970, the ABA House of Dele-
  
principles and mandatory disciplinary standards).  Yet, the Code essentially enshrined the status quo.  
See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978) (noting criticism that the 1969 
Code was “[m]ade for downstate Illinois in the 1860s”).  Cf. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS 60 (1986) (stating that “[o]ne group of reform-minded lawyers contended that the Code had been 
corrupted by revisions made during its drafting process and that opportunities had been missed to make 
the Code clearer and more responsive to modern practice realities”).  In contrast, the Clark Report, on 
many fronts, sought to break new ground and change the status quo. 
 16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 17. The Committee has become known as the “Clark Committee.” 
 18. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 19. See Resume Minutes of the Special Committee on the Evaluation of Lawyer Disciplinary En-
forcement Held in Room 152A in the United States Supreme Court on Saturday November 11, 1967 
(Nov. 13, 1967), at 4 [hereinafter Resume Minutes] (copy on file with the author).  The minutes state, 
with respect to one of Justice Clark’s speeches about problems in disciplinary enforcement: 
The Justice reported that the press in Dallas had highlighted the “horribles” and wondered if 
he should continue to use this type of material in his speeches. The consensus of the Commit-
tee was that these “horribles” were proper and Mr. Hayes [the ABA’s Assistant Director of 
Committee Services] was asked to acquire a set of “horrible” examples for Justice Clark and 
for the Committee generally. 
Id. 
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gates unanimously approved the Clark Report and its numerous recommen-
dations,20 then proceeded with steps to secure implementation by the indi-
vidual states. 
Today, more than a third of a century later, the issues that the Clark 
Committee identified are of continuing importance, but the problems have 
not gone unaddressed.  The Clark Report, coupled with the Watergate crisis 
a few years later, in which so many lawyers were accused or proven guilty 
of wrongdoing,21 ignited a nationwide debate about ethics in the legal pro-
fession.  That debate then triggered a series of reforms in lawyer discipline22 
and in other related areas, including legal education, bar admissions, mal-
practice liability, continuing legal education, and ethics codes.23  Those re-
forms, over subsequent decades, have thoroughly transformed the field of 
attorney professional responsibility.24 
As a result of the Clark Report, “an intense effort began on the part of 
the individual states and the ABA to improve and standardize the discipline 
systems.”25  Lawyer ethics and professional accountability are now matters 
given priority in legal education and in law practice. The public, the media, 
and lawyers themselves expect errant practitioners to be held accountable.  
In general, lawyer disciplinary systems throughout the United States now 
  
 20. See Michael Franck, New Life for Lawyer Self-Discipline:  The Disciplinary Report of the Clark 
Committee, 54 JUDICATURE 383, 383 (1971) (discussing approval of the report). 
 21. See Robert H. Aronson, Professional Responsibility:  Education and Enforcement, 51 WASH. L. 
REV. 273, 273 (1976) (noting that Watergate caused “the American Bar Association, state and local bar 
committees, and law schools to seek new ways of educating prospective lawyers with respect to their 
ethical duties”);  Hon. Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 249 
(1975) (noting that “each new revelation in the national scandal known as Watergate seemed to give the 
legal profession another mark of shame, for the majority of those who had participated in the cover-up 
had been trained as attorneys”).  Justice Clark concluded that “[a]s a result the profession is now at its 
lowest ebb in our history.”  Id. at 260.  See also Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261, 261 (1975) (stating that “approximately half of the individuals indicted or 
convicted for Watergate-related crimes are lawyers”); JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., INSIDE:  A PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LIFE 267–308 (2004) (discussing Watergate); FRED J. MAROON, THE NIXON YEARS 1969–
1974: WHITE HOUSE TO WATERGATE 95–146 (1999) (discussing the Senate Watergate hearings). 
 22. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (stating that “[b]y the mid-1970s, states 
began to review lawyer disciplinary systems and initiated substantive and procedural changes”). 
 23. See Section III infra. 
 24. See Rhonda Richardson Caviedes, Comment, Remnant of an Attorney Disciplinary Sanction:  
Which Jurisdictions Impose Automatic Disbarment?  What Offenses Warrant the Imposition of an Auto-
matic Disciplinary Sanction?, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 195, 197–98 (2002).  
In recent years, the number of jurisdictions with automatic disbarment provisions has de-
clined drastically. This is due in part to the reformation of attorney disciplinary systems 
throughout the United States, which began to occur in the mid-1970s.  The catalyst for this 
change was the release of the American Bar Association’s Special Committee on Evaluation 
of Disciplinary Enforcement Report, which provided an in-depth survey and analysis of at-
torney disciplinary practices throughout the country.  Known as the Clark Report, it shamed 
the American legal community into taking action to better regulate all facets of the American 
legal system.  
Id. at 197. 
 25. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2001–02 (1994) (discussing 
steps to implement the Clark Report recommendations). 
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work efficiently and effectively.26  A 1992 ABA study, known as the 
McKay Report,27 found that “‘revolutionary changes’ had occurred because 
most states had implemented many of the changes prescribed by the Clark 
report.”28  Reasonable persons might today differ on issues relating to the 
funding, mechanics, speed, or scope of lawyer discipline,29 but virtually no 
one thinks of the present state regimes as “scandalous[ly]” deficient.30   
“The Clark Commission=s scathing indictment of lawyer discipline systems 
is widely credited with moving state courts and the organized bar to ac-
tion.”31  As the McKay Report said, “[t]he Clark Report . . . reshaped lawyer 
discipline in the United States.”32   
Justice Clark enjoyed enormous respect among lawyers and judges.33 
Throughout his eighteen years of service on the Supreme Court and during 
  
 26. Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When Attorneys Become Convicted Felons:  The Question of Disci-
pline by the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723, 729–30 (1995) (stating that “[s]ince the Clark Committee 
issued its report in 1970, lawyer disciplinary practices have been transformed into a ‘sophisticated, 
effective system of self-regulation’”) (quoting Timothy McPike & Mark I. Harrison, The True Story on 
Lawyer Discipline, 70 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 92).  But see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. 
KONIAK, & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 935 (3d ed. 1999).  
The course of events since the Clark Report has not been smooth.  Most jurisdictions have in-
troduced reforms along the lines recommended in the report.  At the same time, the volume 
and backlog of disciplinary cases has rapidly increased in many jurisdictions, sometimes 
overwhelming the disciplinary system, as in California in the 1980s and New Jersey in the 
1990s.  The bar takes some satisfaction in its efforts to improve disciplinary enforcement, but 
many lawyers and much of the general public remain dissatisfied with many aspects of cur-
rent disciplinary enforcement. 
Id. 
 27. ABA, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY:  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT]. 
 28. SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, 
LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 49 (2004) (quoting the McKay Report) (emphasis added). 
 29. Id.  Martyn and Fox add that the McKay Commission identified some persistent inadequacies in 
lawyer discipline: 
Funding and staffing levels . . . had not kept pace with the growth in the profession. . . . Se-
cret disciplinary procedures and lack of immunity for complainants continued to shield errant 
lawyers in too many jurisdictions.  Equally important, huge numbers of disciplinary com-
plaints filed by clients that alleged neglect, incompetence, or failure to communicate were be-
ing dismissed by disciplinary authorities as minor infractions, which meant that nothing was 
done to correct the lawyer’s behavior or compensate the client.   
Id. at 49–50.  Martyn and Fox then discuss improvements that have been made during the past ten years, 
including increasingly common use of reciprocal discipline and interim suspension.  Id. at 50 (adding 
that “[t]he scope of public protection has been further expanded by the addition of component agencies, 
such as client protection funds, fee arbitration, mediation of malpractice complaints, law practice assis-
tance and substance abuse counseling”). 
 30. But see Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice:  Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 
TULANE L. REV. 2583, 2591–92 (1996) (noting that “a closer examination of the McKay Report's fol-
low-up on the Clark Report's thirty-six problems could just as easily have led to the conclusion that the 
‘scandalous situation’ that existed in 1970 continues”). 
 31. Levin, supra note 22, at 3–4.  See also Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and 
Rules:  A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by 
U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1136 (1999) (stating that the “stinging 
criticisms of the Clark report” and other factors “eventually led to the establishment of formal regulatory 
systems for lawyer discipline”). 
 32. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 27, intro. 
 33. Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985 (quoting Justice Powell attesting to Justice Clark’s 
great popularity). 
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his decade of work after leaving the Court, Clark served, in the words of 
then-Justice William H. Rehnquist, as a “roving ambassador . . . to the legal 
profession.”34  Having Justice Clark as the head of the Committee that 
called for urgent reforms in lawyer discipline lent gravity, persuasiveness, 
visibility, and appeal to the call for “immediate” action.35  It also calmed the 
nerves of those who worried that the Special Committee’s public hearings 
would result in bad publicity for the legal profession or damage relations 
between state and local bar associations on the one hand and the ABA on 
the other.36 
In terms of law reform, the work product of the Clark Committee has 
been broadly influential.  Indeed, more than three decades of reform in the 
field of legal ethics has been catalyzed by the Clark Report.  At the time that 
it was released, the Report received widespread attention, in part because its 
use of the word “scandalous” attracted the scrutiny of the media.37  On the 
day it was issued, the New York Times said that the Report “appeared to be a 
significant, though cautious, step by the national association to influence 
state and local bar associations to improve their disciplinary procedures.”38  
Today, the Clark Report is more often recognized as a landmark in the de-
velopment of modern legal ethics.39  The Report has been referenced count-
  
 34. Id.  (quoting Justice Rehnquist).  Justice Blackmun similarly described Justice Clark as “a 
superb ambassador, in the literal meaning of that term, from the Court to lawyers everywhere . . . .”  Id. 
 35. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that deficiencies in lawyer discipline required 
“immediate attention”). 
 36. Cf. Letter from Frederick H. Norton, Jr., Executive Secretary, Boston Bar Association, to Earle 
F. Morris, President, ABA (Feb. 6, 1968) (copy on file with the author) (a copy of which was forwarded 
to Justice Clark).  Mr. Norton wrote: 
I think that I can safely say that I express the concern of most bar executives who deal with 
disciplinary matters daily that the ABA’s Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary 
Enforcement exercises substantial discretion in their regional meetings, especially in the area 
of publicity.  The question of discipline, I am sure the committee realizes, is essentially of 
state and local nature.  If it should be inferred by the press from the proposed public hearings 
by your committee that the ABA is investigating disciplinary procedures of state and local as-
sociations, the result would be unfortunate from a public relations standpoint both as far as 
the profession and the public are concerned as well as the relationship between the ABA and 
state and local associations. 
Id. at 1–2. 
 37. See Franck, supra note 20, at 383-85.  
The news media were quick to pick up the term “scandalous,” of course, which embarrassed 
some members of the profession, and angered others.  But even as it signaled a low point . . . 
the report . . . marked the beginning of a concerted effort toward reform.  The very publicity 
which embarrassed some lawyers moved others to look, listen and become constructively 
concerned. 
Id. at 383.  Franck served as Reporter for the Clark Committee.  Id. at 385. 
 38. Fred P. Graham, Bar Panel Urges Action on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1970, at 36 (stating 
that the Report “gingerly skirted the sensitive question of whether misconduct by lawyers was wide-
spread”). 
 39. Some evidence of this fact is personal and anecdotal.  In spring 2004, I served as an expert on 
legal ethics for the American Bar Association=s Asia Law Initiative in their Legal Reform Program in 
Mongolia.  In the written materials that I prepared for my presentations in Ulaan Baatar, I sought to 
explain to Mongolian lawyers the many changes that have taken place in the field of legal ethics in the 
United States during the past 35 years.  My goal was to give them ideas as to how they might institution-
alize the principles reflected in Code of Ethics of Mongolian Advocates that was approved by the Great 
Khural of the Mongolian Advocates Association on September 19, 2003.  I said that reforms in the 
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less times in court decisions,40 textbooks,41 treatises,42 and other publica-
tions.43  In numerous law review articles, the Report has been cited44 and 
discussed,45 praised46 and critiqued.47 
  
United States had been catalyzed by two events, the Clark Report and the Watergate scandal.  When I 
later reviewed the materials prepared by Professor Peter A. Joy of Washington University in St. Louis 
for his presentation on legal ethics as part of the Asia Law Initiative program in Indonesia on February 
24 and 25, 2004, I found that his written materials and Power Point presentation also noted the work of 
the Clark Committee (although without referring to the Committee by name).  The fact that two Ameri-
can law professors, acting independently, found it important to mention the findings of the Clark Report 
to lawyers in developing legal systems in far parts of the globe is evidence of the important role the 
Report has played in the development of American thinking about issues of professional responsibility. 
 40. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 387, 396 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing the Clark Report as evidence that the “administrative machinery of both the 
profession and the courts has proved wholly inadequate to police the profession effectively;” and for the 
proposition that disciplinary enforcement is “extremely difficult”); Cantor v. Sup. Ct., 353 F. Supp. 
1307, 1310–11 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discussing the Clark Report and disciplinary reforms in Pennsylvania, 
and quoting ABA President Robert W. Meserve, who had served on the Committee, as stating that 
“states are moving to give the disciplinary system the muscle it needs to correct deficiencies brought to 
national attention in the Clark committee study”); In re Judicial Misconduct, 2 Cl. Ct. 255, 261 n.8 & 
n.11 (Cl. Ct. 1983) (quoting the Clark Report and noting that Chief Justice Warren Burger “repeatedly 
cited the findings . . . and urged that firm action be taken”); In re Curtis, No. 02-C-15210, 2003 WL 
22187249, at *4 (Cal. Bar. Ct. Sept. 17, 2003) (stating that the “seminal 1970 report . . . concluded that 
‘no single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to blame for any lack of public confidence in the 
integrity of the bar than the policy that permits a convicted attorney to continue to practice while appar-
ently enjoying immunity from discipline’”); Petition of Albert, 269 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Mich. 1978) 
(noting the Clark Report’s recommendation regarding the conditions for reinstatement of a disbarred 
attorney); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct., 363 A.2d 779, 781 n.6 (Pa. 1976) 
(citing the Report and stating that in reinstatement cases “the main thrust of the proceeding is whether 
the disciplined attorney is now morally fit and technically competent to engage in the practice of law”).  
Id. at 782 n.6 (citing the Report as discussing the privacy interests of practicing attorneys facing discipli-
nary charges rather than the interests of attorneys petitioning for reinstatement); McLaughlin v. Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376, 380 (1975) (citing the Clark Report in a disbarment proceeding);  Id. at 
n.11 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that the Clark Report urged wide-ranging reforms because of public 
mistrust of the legal profession); Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar, 326 
S.E.2d 705, 712 & n.12 (W. Va. 1985) (citing the Report in connection with whether disciplinary pro-
ceedings should be public).  
 41. See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE 
PROFESSION 43 (3d ed. 2004).  According to Professor Crystal: 
As a result of the Clark Committee’s report, the ABA appointed a standing Committee on 
Professional Discipline.  The committee prepared Standards for Lawyer Discipline, adopted 
by the ABA in 1979, which followed many of the recommendations made by the Clark 
Committee.  Since then the ABA adopted a new set of provisions, the Model Rules for Law-
yer Disciplinary Enforcement. 
Id.  See also VERN COUNTRYMAN, TED FINMAN, & THEODORE J. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 811–12 (1976) (quoting an article about the Clark Report); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 756 (5th ed. 1998) (mentioning the Clark Report and a 
subsequent ABA evaluation of lawyer discipline); HAZARD, KONIAK, & CRAMTON, supra note 26, at 
934–35 (discussing the Clark Report); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION:  RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 484–89 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting and discussing the 
Clark Report); MARTYN &  FOX, supra note 28, at 49 (discussing the Clark Report); MAYNARD E. PIRSIG 
& KENNETH F. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (4th ed. 1984) 
(quoting the Clark Report). 
 42. See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2001 (1994) (discussing 
the Clark Commission); WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 83 (stating that disciplinary systems in many states 
were re-examined in response to the criticisms of the Clark Report). 
 43. See Franck, supra note 20, at 383–89 (summarizing the findings of the Clark Committee); 
Lawrence F. Gardner, Report on Disciplinary Enforcement in New Hampshire, 15 N.H. BAR J. 199, 
199–210 (1974) (discussing several recommendations of the Clark Committee and what was needed to 
implement them); Joryn Jenkin, Lawyer Regulation, 43 FED. LAW., May 1996, at 5 (stating that the 
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Clark Committee determined that “discipline at the bar was virtually non-existent”); Robert B. Kane, 
Lawyer Discipline in Florida, 44 FLA. B.J. 522–23 (1970) (describing the Clark Report as “excellent in 
all aspects”); Chief Justice Horace Wilkie, The Role of the Supreme Court in Regulating the Ethics of 
Lawyers and Judges, 49 WIS. B. BULL., Feb. 1976, at 23, 26 (stating that “[t]he recommendations of the 
Clark Committee . . . have been followed in many states”); Richard L. Wright, Self-Discipline of the 
Bar:  Theory or Fact, 57 A.B.A. J. 757, 758 (1971) (discussing the Clark Report).  “The report of the 
Clark Committee presented in graphic language the story of where we were in disciplinary enforcement.  
Generally speaking . . . we have been mired in the mud flats of apathy and inaction.”  Id. 
 44. See Arsonson, supra note 21, at 273 (citing the Clark Report); Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., The 
Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 SW. L.J. 708, 717 (1972) (citing the Clark Report’s discussion of reluc-
tance on the part of lawyers and judges to report instances of professional misconduct as a  “major prob-
lem”); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:  Who Should Control Law-
yer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1209 n.154 (2003) (citing 
the Clark Report as evidence that “attorney discipline is, and always has been, a neglected area”); Rus-
sell W. Damtoft, Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards:  Broad v. Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IOWA L. 
REV. 1386, 1399 n.95, 1400 n.111, 1402 n.125 (1980) (citing the Clark Report and noting that it found 
that complaints against prominent attorneys received too little attention in disciplinary proceedings); 
Lawrence A. Dubin, How the Michigan Supreme Court Can Better Protect the Public from Bad Law-
yers:  The Ball Is in Their Court, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 667, 668–69 (1996) (quoting the Clark 
Report); Christopher S. Lyman, State Bar Discipline and the Activist Lawyer, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 235, 235 n.2, 239, 251–52 (1973) (citing and quoting the Clark Report); F. Raymond Marks & 
Darlene Cathcart, Discipline with the Legal Profession:  Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 
193–231 (containing numerous references to the Clark Report); Valerie Swett, Illinois Attorney Disci-
pline, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 325, 325 n.2, 325 n.5, 331 n.31, 356 n.172 (1977) (containing citations to the 
Clark Report); Note, Enforcement of Legal Ethics in New Jersey, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 707 n.1, 715 
n.47, 718 n.61 (1975) (citing the Clark Report); Comment, Discipline of Attorneys in Maryland, 35 MD. 
L. REV. 236, 243 n.40, 244 n.43 (1975) (citing and quoting the Clark Report); Gregory J. Digel, Com-
ment, Procedures to Disciplining Attorneys in Virginia, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 439–54 (1972) 
(containing numerous references to the Clark Report). 
 45. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 31, at 1135 (discussing the work of the “blue-ribbon” Clark Commit-
tee); Dhanda, Note, supra note 26, at 725–33 (including an extensive discussion of the Clark Report=s 
recommendation that convicted attorneys be disciplined); David Freedman & Christopher Key, Com-
ment, The Clark Report and the Revised New Mexico Disciplinary Procedures, 2 N.M. L. REV. 294, 307 
(1972) (indicating that the State had adopted new disciplinary procedures including Aalmost every rec-
ommendation@ of the Clark Report); George L. Hampton, Toward an Expanded Use of the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655, 656–57 & n.9 (1991) (discussing the findings of 
the Clark Report); Gerald J. Kross, Recent Decision, Professional Ethics, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 651, 658 
(1998) (discussing the historical context of the Clark Report); Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 
86 KY. L.J. 395, 400 n.19 (1998) (citing the report as an example of the profession=s manner of address-
ing problems in the regulation of lawyers); Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 419 nn.51 & 53 (citing the Clark report and discussing the views of 
Justice Clark with regard to disciplinary enforcement); R. F. Outcault, Jr. and George E. Peterson, Law-
yer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: Progress and Problems, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 
676 (1973) (stating that A[t]he well-noted conclusions of the Clark Report on the present status of disci-
plinary enforcement have prompted a general re-examination by state bars of methods of lawyer disci-
pline@); Michele J. Woods, The Adoption of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions by the 
Alaska Supreme Court—In re Buckalew, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 365, 367 & n.18 (1989) (stating that the 
Clark Report Arecognized the need for standards for enforcing the existing ethical rules formulated by the 
ABA@); Douglas H. Balcombe, Note, Standards of Discipline for Attorneys in Colorado and the Signifi-
cance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 50 DENVER L.J. 207, 212 n.34 (1973) (discussing 
changes that were Aundoubtedly influenced by recommendations@ made in the Clark Report); The Bar 
and Watergate:  Conversation with Chesterfield Smith, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 31, 37 (1974) (discuss-
ing the cost of implementing the Clark Committee recommendations). 
 46. See, e.g., Burton C. Agasta, Admissions and Discipline of Attorneys in Federal District Courts:  
A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 253 (1975) (referring to the “influential Clark 
Committee Report”); Paul A. Demoga, Note, Achieving Effective Bar Discipline, 6 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
974, 987 (1972) (opining that the Clark Committee offered “viable solutions”); Levin, supra note 22, at 
2–3 (stating that the Clark Report is widely credited with instigating the reform of lawyer discipline); 
Weckstein, supra note 21, at 263 (citing the “excellent” report of the Clark Committee). 
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“The Clark Report signaled the emergence of a new age in lawyer dis-
cipline . . . .”48  But beyond that, the work of the Clark Committee precipi-
tated a series of other reforms and developments that have entirely reshaped 
the field of attorney professional responsibility.  Consequently, it is likely 
that no other public service by a former Supreme Court Justice has had a 
greater impact on American society or done more to improve public confi-
dence in the administration of justice than Tom Clark’s leadership in the 
field of legal ethics. 
II.  THE CLARK COMMITTEE AND ITS REPORT 
The Clark Committee was created at the ABA Midyear Meeting in Feb-
ruary 1967.  Its charge was “[t]o assemble and study information relevant to 
all aspects of professional discipline, . . . and to make such recommenda-
tions as the Committee may deem necessary and appropriate to exact the 
highest possible standards of professional conduct and responsibility.”49 
The Committee, which included seven men,50 obviously took its work 
seriously.  Prior to the appointment of the Clark Committee, the system of 
lawyer discipline had received “little attention,”51 and reliable data were 
unavailable.52  The Committee had to gather the facts,53 analyze them, craft 
  
            In an historical essay marking the 100th anniversary of the Arkansas Bar Association, one of its 
former presidents recently wrote: 
[W]e can thank the late Justice Tom C. Clark of the United States Supreme Court for the 
stimulus, the assistance, and the encouragement which enabled both the Arkansas Supreme 
Court and the Arkansas Bar to develop an effective and efficient disciplinary system in which 
all Arkansas attorneys can take pride. 
Jack Deacon, United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark Helps Establish a Disciplinary System 
for Arkansas Lawyers, 51 ARK. L. REV. 660, 661 (1998). 
 47. Interestingly, the only negative assessment that I have found of the Clark Report was written by 
one of my faculty colleagues when he was a law student.  See Douglas R. Haddock, The Legal Profes-
sion’s Attempt to Discipline Its Members:  A Critique of the Clark Report, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 611 
(offering extensive critical analysis and finding numerous shortcomings). 
 48. Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 926 (1994). 
 49. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at xiii. 
 50. Justice Clark served as chair of the Committee.  The members included John G. Bonomi (New 
York, New York), Joe J. Harrel (Pensacola, Florida), Fred B. Hulse (Sedalia, Missouri), Robert Meserve 
(Boston, Massachusetts), David W. Richmond (Washington, D.C.), and John A. Sutro (San Francisco, 
California).  Michael Franck (Lansing, Michigan) was the Reporter for the Committee.  Id. at iii. 
 51. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2001 (1994) (stating that 
“[p]rior to 1967, little attention was paid by either the profession or the individual states to lawyer disci-
pline”); CRYSTAL, supra note 41, at 42 (stating the point with reference to the appointment of the Clark 
Committee in 1967).  
 52. The Clark Committee reported, “[s]tatistics are unavailable because many disciplinary agencies 
keep no records at all and a substantial proportion of those that do are inconsistent, the quality and extent 
of their records depending largely on the conscientiousness of the chairman in any given year.” CLARK 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.  Early during the work of the Committee, Justice Clark lamented, “[w]e 
started out and of course we had no information as to the various states.  There was no information 
concerning the disciplinary procedures. . . . We found out there was a hodgepodge. . . . As a conse-
quence, it is difficult to say just what the situation is.”  Tom C. Clark, Address, 47 NEB. L. REV. 359, 367 
(1968) [hereinafter Clark, Address]  See also Mr. Justice Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 
PA. B. ASS’N Q. 484, 484 (1968) [hereinafter Clark, Disciplinary Procedures] (discussing the difficulties 
of collecting information about the state of lawyer discipline in the United States). 
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recommendations, and then persuade the profession to follow the Commit-
tee’s advice.  Justice Clark was personally involved in all phases of the 
work,54 approving the survey instruments55 and correspondence,56 urging 
bar leaders to answer queries57 and complementing their work,58 arranging 
meetings at the Supreme Court59 and other locations, securing funding for 
the Committee,60 persuading lawyers to attend regional meetings,61 and gen-
  
 53. Cf. Resume Minutes, supra note 19, at 1 (copy on file with the author) (stating that various 
questionnaires had been sent to integrated and non-integrated bar associations). 
 54. Justice Clark’s involvement even extended to reviewing and correcting the minutes of the 
Committee meetings.  See Memorandum from David A.J. Hayes, Jr., to the Special Committee on the 
Evaluation of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (Nov. 14, 1967) (copy on file with the author) (with 
handwritten annotation by “TCC,” indicating to Hayes which Committee member had been omitted from 
the list of those present). 
 55. The Committee held its first organizational meeting in Washington on May 17, 1967. “At this 
meeting, inter alia, a sub-committee was appointed to draft a questionnaire to be sent principally to state 
and local bar associations which are responsible for professional discipline.”  Report of Special Commit-
tee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, submitted by Tom C. Clark, Chairman, June 9, 1967 
(copy on file with the author). The Committee had a clear sense of the types of problems it was likely to 
document through its research.  The questionnaires were intended to pinpoint problems in “funding and 
staffing grievance committees; lawyer registration; time lags in discipline procedures; inadequate contact 
with possible sources of information on lawyer misconduct; records; lawyer reluctance to ‘inform’ on 
other lawyers; lack of client security funds; reinstatement of disbarred lawyers.”  Clark Committee 
Schedules Regional Meetings as Part of Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, 12 AM. B. NEWS, Dec. 
1967, at 1, 1. 
 56. See Letter from (presumably) Alice L. O’Donnell, Justice Clark’s secretary, to David Hayes, 
ABA (Dec. 30, 1967) (copy on file with the author) (stating “the Justice would like to see anything and 
everything that goes out over his name—before it goes out”).  The letter also queried whether the Justice 
would receive financial reports on the status of the Committee.  Id. 
 57. Cf. Resume Minutes, supra note 19, at 2 (copy on file with the author) (stating that state and 
local bar associations had nominated liaison members to work with the Clark Committee). 
 58. See, e.g., Letter from Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Robert B. Williamson, Sup. Jud. Ct. of Me., 
(Jan. 15, 1968) (copy on file with author) (“I was particularly pleased to read [John Ballou’s] frank 
comment that the Bar has, in the past, not always met its obligation to ‘keep its house in order.’”). 
 59. Cf. Letter from Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Garrett H. Elmore, Special Counsel, State Bar of Cal. 
(Apr. 18, 1967) (copy on file with the author) (discussing a meeting scheduled for May 1967); Resume 
Minutes, supra note 19 (copy on file with the author) (stating date and location of meeting). 
 60. Justice Clark personally pleaded the case for adequate funding of his Committee=s work.  See 
Letter from (apparently) Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Bert H. Early, Exec. Dir., ABA 1–2 (Mar. 14, 1968) 
(copy on file with author). 
[T]he Committee plan is to issue a full and detailed report, perhaps in the form of a legal 
monograph which can and I believe should be published. . . .  I am confident from my discus-
sions that there will be a great demand for a report. . . .  Michael Franck, of the staff of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, who played an active role in the New York 
Regional meeting, and who, I am advised, has an excellent background as a legal writer and 
researcher, is available to do the additional Committee work on an hourly basis.  I am sending 
Mr. Hayes a copy of this letter and requesting that he discuss compensation for Mr. Franck 
with you and Noble Stephens.  My estimate at this time is that we will need an additional 
$10,000 to carry us through this Association year (July 1, 1967 - June 30, 1968). . . .  As for 
the future, I estimate that we will continue to need $20,000 a year to complete this important 
work in a proper and meaningful manner.  Without these funds the Committee could make 
only a very cursory and superficial examination of the many problems we are uncovering.  
With adequate funds we can come up with a report and recommendations that will be of con-
siderable help to both the bench and the bar and in an area where it is badly needed. 
Id. 
 61. Regional meetings were held in New York, Washington, Miami, San Francisco, Boston, Dallas, 
and Chicago.  See Graham, supra note 38, at 36 (discussing the hearings). 
            It appears that Justice Clark individually urged attendance at the regional meetings by penning 
personal notes on letters to leaders of the legal profession.  The Clark files at the University of Texas 
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erally promoting the importance of the project.62  Justice Clark not only read 
the materials gathered by the Committee, but personally responded to bar 
leaders who gathered the information, and he expressed interest in learning 
additional details relating to their suggestions.63  On occasion, he also di-
rectly apologized to persons with concerns about the format of the regional 
meetings.64 
In addressing the problems of lawyer discipline, Justice Clark also 
manifested a willingness to “think outside the box.”  For example, he enter-
tained, on at least one occasion, the idea of using a type of ABA strike-force 
to generate bad publicity that would embarrass local bar associations into 
acting on pending grievances65—an approach that the Clark Committee 
ultimately found unnecessary.  Justice Clark dedicated himself to the task of 
reforming professional discipline, because he believed that it had merit.  In 
his words, “[t]he work of this Committee, I believe, is one of the most im-
portant activities ever undertaken by the ABA for the benefit of the profes-
sion and the public.”66 
Justice Clark actively participated in reviewing the data gathered by the 
Committee.  Shortly after he was appointed to head the evaluation of disci-
  
contain original letters dated January 26, 1968, to Hon. J. Edward Lumbard (Chief Judge United States 
Court of Appeals), William T. Gossett (President-Elect, American Bar Association), Bernard G. Segal 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Richmond, Virginia), and Whitney North Seymore 
(New York, New York) signed by Justice Clark bearing varied personal annotations by Justice Clark.  A 
note on the letters in handwriting states “[d]id not mail any in this group.”  (Copies on file with the 
author).  It seems likely that similar letters may have been written to other persons incidental to the 
activities of the Committee. 
 62. Resume Minutes, supra note 19, at 4 (copy on file with the author) (“Justice Clark reported that 
he had given speeches on the work of the Committee and the problem of disciplinary enforcement gen-
erally, in Omaha on October 19, 1967, and in Dallas on October 20, 1967.”).  
 63. See., e.g., Letter from Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Frank W. Marsalek, esq. 1 (Jan. 13, 1968) (copy 
on file with the author) (“Your report was read with considerable interest . . . .  I should be interested in 
discussing it with you when next you are in Washington.  I hope you will keep this in mind and give me 
a call at the Court.”); Letter from Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Angelo E. Trogan 1 (Jan. 13, 1968) (copy on 
file with the author) (“If you would be good enough to send me in more detail what some of your ideas 
are I shall be glad to present them to the Committee membership for consideration.”). 
 64. See Letter from Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to John B. Walsh, General Counsel, B. Ass’n of Erie 
County (Mar. 20, 1968) (copy on file with the author) (“My understanding was the same as yours, i.e., it 
would be a closed session where every grievance committee could speak up freely.  I agree that the 
‘canned speeches’ are of little assistance. . . .  I am sure sorry.  My best wishes.  Forgive me!”) 
 65. See Letter from (apparently) Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to John D. Randall 1–2 (Feb. 1, 1968) (copy 
on file with the author).  
Our staff says that one of the most recurring problems has been the refusal of lawyers to co-
operate, first, in the filing of complaints against known violators and, second, after one does 
get filed, then rushing to a lawyer’s rescue, even though they know him to be guilty.  I think 
if we had an ABA-Oversee committee that could fly into a town after a local grievance com-
mittee had failed to act, and hold a hearing, in public, it would bring about sufficient pressure 
on the local committee so that it would take some action. . . .  I believe that after this occurred 
two or three times that state committees would get busy because they would much prefer to 
clean up their own house than have it smeared over the front pages of a newspaper by the ac-
tion of an out-of-state national group. 
Id. 
 66. See Letter from (apparently) Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Bert H. Early, Executive Director, ABA 
4–5 (Mar. 14, 1968) (copy on file with the author) (handwritten draft; final text of the letter used differ-
ent language to convey the importance of the project). 
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plinary enforcement, Justice Clark contracted hepatitis in Bangkok during 
an around-the-world trip which he had scheduled to begin shortly after he 
left the Supreme Court.67  Upon returning home prematurely, he reviewed 
the data and information assembled by the Special Committee during peri-
ods of required bed rest.68  This was typical of Justice Clark.  In the words 
of John P. Frank, Justice Clark, by nature, was “more a plowhorse than a 
showhorse.”69  “Clark did not glide on the wave; he rowed the boat.”70  He 
was “incapable of avoiding attention to details.”71 
While the Report was being prepared and after it was issued, Justice 
Clark delivered speeches72 and wrote articles73 to reinforce its message, 
urging lawyers to assist in the work of disciplinary reform.74  Of course, 
other persons joined with Justice Clark to secure for the Committee the co-
operation of lawyers75 and to implement the Report’s recommendations.76  
Yet, Justice Clark was far more than a figurehead.  His personal files relat-
ing to the project are voluminous, and they show that he was deeply in-
volved in the project to reform lawyer discipline across America.77  
  
 67. See Letter from Tom. C. Clark, U.S. J., to Earl Morris, President-elect, ABA (May 4, 1967) 
(copy on file with the author) (describing trip). 
 68. See Clark, Address, supra note 52, at 368. (stating “I have been reading the papers in Washing-
ton.  I don’t have much to do, since the doctors say I have to go to bed every afternoon for three hours, 
but read papers.”). 
 69. Frank, supra note 7, at 43 (describing Justice Clark’s work in the field of judicial administra-
tion). 
 70. Id. at 44. 
 71. Id. at 45. 
 72. See Howard W. Brill, The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct 1969-
1979:  A Call for Reform, 33 ARK. L. REV. 571, 574–96 (1980) (containing numerous citations to the 
Clark Report and discussing Justice Clark’s work in Arkansas to promote the recommendations of the 
committee); Clark, Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 52, at 485 (stating that “[a] disgraceful state of 
affairs is found in a complete breakdown of central reporting of disciplinary action” and urging that 
Pennsylvania investigate its system of lawyer discipline). 
 73. See Clark, supra note 21, at 259 (referring to the recommendations of the Clark Committee); 
Tom C. Clark, Changing Times, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (1975) [hereinafter Clark, Changing Times] 
(calling for the Bar to correct its “laissez-faire” attitude to lawyer discipline). 
 74. See Clark, Address, supra note 52, at 369 (discussing the Committee and its work in a speech to 
Nebraska lawyers). 
I think it is a very important assignment that [ABA President] Orisin Marden has given me.  I 
have a very fine committee. . . .  We intend to do something about [lawyer discipline].  We 
need the help of the lawyers. 
            . . . .  
            . . . I want to help on this.  Our committee wants to help on it, and I want you to help.  
I want you to help me so that I might help you. 
Id. 
 75. The Clark Committee sometimes had difficulty securing the cooperation of lawyers.  See Letter 
from Orison S. Marden, Last Retiring President of the ABA, to Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., (Feb. 7, 1968) 
(copy on file with the author) (stating “I am distressed to learn that you are finding the bar uncoopera-
tive. . . .  I talked today with Earle Morris and we will do our level best to impress upon the presidents of 
state bar associations and principal local bar associations that they must give you their full coopera-
tion.”).  In the Clark papers, the word “must” was underscored twice in blue ink.  Id. 
 76. Wright, supra note 43, at 758 (stating that “[i]mmediately after its action on the report and 
recommendations of the Clark Committee, the [ABA] House of Delegates created a Special Committee   
. . . to bring about [the] prompt implementation of the recommendations”). 
 77. The files are now housed on the sixth floor of the Tarlton Law Library at the University of 
Texas School of Law in Austin. 
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At the same time, Justice Clark was the right public face for the Com-
mittee.  He was trusted, respected, and extraordinarily well-known and well-
liked in the legal profession.  Justice Clark was described by pillars of the 
profession as a “crusader”78 and “literal missionary”79 for the better admini-
stration of justice.80  At the time of his retirement from the Court in 1967, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that Justice Clark had “worked prodi-
giously to awaken lawyers and judges to a realization of their responsibili-
ties,”81 and John P. Frank concluded that “[n]o other single person has ever 
had so wide a consequence on the administration of justice among the vari-
ous states.”82  Ten years later, at the time of Justice Clark=s death in 1977 at 
age 77,83 Chief Justice Warren Burger said, “[n]o one in the past thirty years 
has done more than Tom Clark to improve justice in our country, and no 
one had such universal esteem of the lawyers and judges of this country.”84 
The Clark Report is a compact but passionate document approximately 
200 pages in length.  It analyzes and recommends appropriate remedial ac-
tion to address 36 different problems that the Committee identified in the 
field of lawyer discipline.  With stories from real life written in anonymous 
terms to protect the Committee’s sources,85 the Report is packed with vivid 
vignettes that illustrate the deficiencies of attorney discipline in the late 
1960s.  In reporting this evidence, the tone of the Report is often one of 
amazement,86 but from front to back, the document is imbued with the 
Committee=s confidence that systems of lawyer discipline could be made to 
function in ways that would both protect the citizenry and treat lawyers 
fairly.  The Committee emphasized that “the public dissatisfaction with the 
bar and the courts [was] much more intense than [was] generally believed 
within the profession.”87 
The Clark Committee catalogued numerous deficiencies.  It found, for 
example: 
  
 78. Warren, supra note 6, at 1 (describing Justice Clark as Aa crusader for the better administration 
of justice@).  
 79. Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985 (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger as stating that 
“Clark was a literal missionary for the improvement of judicial administration”).  See also id. (quoting 
Justice Potter Stewart as stating that Justice Clark worked tirelessly for “fair administration of federal 
justice”). 
 80. In less lofty terms, Justice Clark was also described as “the traveling salesman of justice.” 
Frank, supra note 7, at 8. 
 81. Warren, supra note 6, at 1. 
 82. Frank, supra note 7, at 56. 
 83. Tom C. Clark was born September 23, 1899, and died on June 13, 1977, ten years and one day 
after retiring from the Supreme Court.  GOLDMAN, supra note 13. 
 84. Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985. 
 85. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at xvii (discussing methodology). 
 86. For example, the Committee states: 
[A] majority of the states do not take disciplinary action against attorneys convicted of fed-
eral income tax violations.  Although these states invariably prosecute an attorney guilty of 
converting the funds of a single client, they somehow have concluded that conversion of 
funds belonging to all the citizens of the United States does not constitute moral turpitude 
and, consequently, does not warrant disciplinary action. 
Id. at 3. 
 87. Id. at 2. 
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• that “in some instances disbarred attorneys [were] able to con-
tinue to practice in another locale;”88 
• that “lawyers convicted of serious crimes [were] not disciplined 
until after appeals from their convictions [were] concluded,” often 
years following the misconduct;89  
• that “even after disbarment lawyers [were] reinstated as a matter 
of course;”90 
• that lawyers failed to report violations of the ethics code or 
criminal law to disciplinary authorities;91 
• that lawyers would not cooperate in disciplinary proceedings 
against other lawyers but instead would use their influence “to sty-
mie the proceedings;”92 
• that in small towns and cities, disciplinary authorities would “not 
proceed against prominent lawyers or law firms;”93 
• that state disciplinary agencies were “undermanned and underfi-
nanced, many having no staff whatever for the investigation or 
prosecution of complaints;”94 
• that “[l]ack of adequate financing [was] the most universal and 
significant problem in disciplinary enforcement;”95 and 
• that overall, “the present enforcement structure [was] failing to 
rid the profession of a substantial number of malefactors.”96 
 
Likewise, the prescriptions called for by the Clark Committee were exten-
sive.  The Committee recommended: 
 
• that lawyer discipline in the various states “be centralized by 
vesting exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction in the state’s highest 
court under a procedure promulgated and supervised by the court in 
the exercise of its inherent power to supervise the bar;”97 
  
 88. Id. at 1. 
 89. Id. 
 90. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2. 
 95. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 19–20 (finding that “disciplinary agencies throughout the 
country [were] handicapped severely by the lack of financial resources”). 
 96. Id. at 2–3. 
 97. Id. at xiv.  The Committee also found that “[t]he legislative process itself is a far less desirable 
forum for meaningful reform of the disciplinary structure than judicial deliberation in chambers.”  Id. at 
12.  In the view of the Committee, judges were more immune from political pressures and less suscepti-
ble to the “element of compromise inherent in the legislative process . . . .”  Id.  Interestingly, the Com-
mittee “strongly urge[d] courts having disciplinary jurisdiction to exercise their inherent power and to 
strike down any attempt by the legislature to interfere with their exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline 
of attorneys.” CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 13.  It is difficult to imagine this type of activist rec-
ommendation receiving the type of unanimous approval as that which the Clark Report received from 
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• that “[a]ll matters involving allegations of misconduct on the 
part of an attorney [be] submitted initially to a professional staff for 
investigation;”98 
• that disciplinary staffs be adequately funded;99 
• that procedures be simplified,100 unnecessary formalities elimi-
nated,101 and matters concluded more promptly;102 
• that membership on disciplinary committees be more representa-
tive of the diversity of the profession;103 
• that a “permanent record of every complaint” be maintained;104 
• that there be improved “exchange of information between disci-
plinary agencies concerning discipline imposed on attorneys admit-
ted . . . in more than one jurisdiction”105 and imposition of “recipro-
cal discipline;”106 
• that an attorney be “suspended forthwith” upon conviction of a 
serious crime;107  
• that “attorneys who are disbarred or suspended [be required to] 
notify all clients within a specified time of their inability to continue 
to represent them and the necessity for promptly retaining new 
counsel;”108 
• that a person disbarred either not be readmitted or be readmitted 
only after the maximum period for suspension had elapsed, and then 
only upon an “affirmative showing by the applicant that he pos-
sesses the requisite qualities of character and learning;”109 
• that sanctions be imposed, “in appropriate circumstances, 
against attorneys and judges who fail to report attorney misconduct 
of which they are aware;”110 
• that attorneys be required to maintain accurate records of client 
funds, which would be audited annually;111 
• that judicial training courses be expanded “to include instruction 
in substantive and procedural problems in disciplinary enforce-
ment;”112 and  
  
the ABA House of Delegates in 1970.  This may be evidence of the gravity with which the problems of 
lawyer discipline were perceived at that time. 
 98. Id. at xiv. 
 99. Id. at 20. 
 100. Id. at 30–31. 
 101. Id. at 71. 
 102. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 30–31. 
 103. Id. at 46 (referring to “single and small-firm practitioners, members of minority groups and 
attorneys engaged in negligence and criminal law” practices). 
 104. Id. at 78. 
 105. Id. at 2. 
 106. Id. at 121. 
 107. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
 108. Id. at 148. 
 109. Id. at 151. 
 110. Id. at 167. 
 111. See id. at 173. 
File: Justice Tom Clark - Johnson (Final) eic Created on: 5/31/2005 4:24 PM Last Printed: 5/31/2005 7:39 PM 
2005] Justice Tom C. Clark's Legacy 49 
• that “procedures for arbitrating fee disputes” be created.113 
III.  THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF REFORM IN LEGAL ETHICS  
It has been roughly thirty-five years since the Report of the Clark 
Committee and the Watergate crisis.  During those years, there have been 
numerous important reforms in the field of legal ethics.114  Some of these 
developments are directly linked to the Clark Report, such as the reform of 
lawyer discipline.  Other developments, such as changes in legal education, 
can be tied to Justice Clark individually, who personally called for such 
reforms.115  But even where it is not possible to link directly the develop-
ments noted below to Justice Clark’s work on or off the Committee, it is 
clear that those changes are part of a larger wave of attorney ethics reform 
that was initially instigated by the publication of the Clark Report.  A dis-
cussion of the most notable recent developments in legal ethics follows. 
A.  Modernization of Lawyer Discipline  
The enforcement of ethics rules through disciplinary actions against at-
torneys has been professionalized in most American states.116  Such systems 
no longer rely exclusively upon volunteer prosecutors to do the work,117 as 
was often the case prior to the Clark Report.118  Rather, in most states, there 
are now professional prosecutors who are employed to investigate client 
complaints and litigate cases against attorneys when facts warrant prosecu-
tion.119 
  
 112. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 175. 
 113. Id. at 186. 
 114. See generally Carol M. Langford & David M. Bell, Finding a Voice:  The Legal Ethics Com-
mittee, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 855, 859 (2002) (discussing changes in the legal profession).  “The past 
thirty-five years have witnessed two key developments in the regulation of lawyers.  First, the profes-
sional responsibility rules have evolved from hortatory norms to enforceable disciplinary standards.  
Second, state systems overseeing the regulation and discipline of lawyers have become professional-
ized.”  Id.  
 115. See Section III-B infra (discussing ethics education in law schools). 
 116. See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2003 (1994) (stating 
that Amost states have an office of discipline counsel staffed by paid employees@); see also Allen Blu-
menthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal Profession, 3 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 6, 6 (1994) (stating that “[t]he legal profession has entered a new era . . . [with] a 
much more active and professional formal attorney disciplinary system”). 
 117. Cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 396 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that disciplinary proceedings traditionally were Aconducted initially by voluntary bar com-
mittees subject to judicial review@). 
 118. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 31 (stating that A[m]uch of the delay inherent in the 
disciplinary process results from reliance on volunteer practitioners to process, investigate and prosecute 
complaints of attorney misconduct@).   
 119. See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2004 (1994) (“The 
disciplinary agency generally hires a lawyer or lawyers to act as counsel. . . .  This lawyer serves as 
prosecutor for the agency and makes initial determinations about complaints, evidence, jurisdiction, and 
further action on the matter.”) 
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Ordinary attorneys still volunteer their time to help with the disciplinary 
process.120  These attorneys often sit on committees to make a factual de-
termination as to whether the ethics code has been violated.  This is pre-
cisely what the Clark Committee envisioned when it wrote: 
[T]he volunteer, practicing attorney should [not] be removed from 
the disciplinary process.  To the contrary, the employment of a full-
time professional staff to investigate and prosecute complaints 
would permit the volunteer members of inquiry and hearing com-
mittees to devote their full attention to evaluating cases developed 
by the staff, a role that should remain the responsibility of practic-
ing attorneys who are fully conversant with the problems of day-to-
day practice.121 
However, the Clark Committee was emphatic that engagement of a 
well-trained professional staff was essential. The Clark Committee proposed 
the “[d]evelopment of courses in enforcement practices, procedural manuals 
and other procedures for training professional disciplinary agency staffs        
. . . .”
122
  The Committee’s Report stated “[t]he absence of an adequate pro-
fessional staff, and in many jurisdictions the absence of any staff, presents 
an insurmountable obstacle to effective disciplinary enforcement.”123 
The Committee found that lack of professional staffs resulted in delay, 
nonuniform standards, lack of expertise, inability to conduct investigations, 
inadequate record keeping, and procedures violative of due process.124  In 
most jurisdictions these findings have been heeded and professional staffs 
now play an important role in the disciplinary process. 
In many states today, clients are clearly told that they have a right to file 
a grievance against a lawyer.125 Once a complaint is received by disciplinary 
authorities, typically the lawyer has 30 days to file a response.126  Attorneys 
have an ethical duty to cooperate with a grievance investigation, and failure 
to do so is itself a basis for discipline.127 
  
 120. The Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement recommend that “hearing committees 
consist of two lawyers and one non-lawyer.”  See id. at 101:2005. 
 121. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 55. 
 122. Id. at 57. 
 123. Id. at 48. 
 124. Id. at 49–54 (discussing failings). 
 125. For example, in the State of Texas, the client=s right to file a grievance must be spelled out in 
the written fee agreement between the lawyer and client.  See ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. 
HARDWICK, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS § 17.03, at 830 (2003).  If the lawyer 
does not put that provision in the contract, the lawyer must provide clients with a brochure about the 
disciplinary system or post a sign in the law office prominently informing clients that they can complain 
to authorities if they believe the ethics code has been violated.   Id. at 830. 
 126. See id. at 820 (discussing Texas). 
 127. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Failure to Co-operate with or Obey Disciplinary Authorities 
as Ground for Disciplining Attorney—Modern Cases, 37 A.L.R.4th § 2(a), at 646 (2004).  Landis states 
that “[m]any jurisdictions have adopted disciplinary rules . . . requiring an attorney’s co-operation during 
the disciplinary process, subject to the privilege against self-incrimination . . . [and] the vast majority of 
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In many states, the filing of a grievance is completely privileged.128  
The client has absolute immunity from liability to the lawyer for damages 
resulting from the filing.  A lawyer cannot sue a client to retaliate for the 
filing of a grievance.  The Clark Committee, recognizing a division of au-
thority among the states, with some according complainants only a qualified 
privilege defeasible by proof of malice, strongly recommended that states 
provide any individual who files a disciplinary complaint with absolute im-
munity from suits.129  The Committee stated: 
A policy of conferring absolute immunity on the complainant en-
courages those who have some doubt about an attorney’s conduct to 
submit the matter to the proper agency, where it may be examined 
and determined.  A complainant’s ability to address such a forum 
without fear of suit is essential if the profession is to maintain high 
standards.130 
The changes wrought by the Clark Report in the field of lawyer disci-
pline have been chronicled elsewhere.131  Suffice it to say that when one 
  
cases explicitly or implicitly hold that an attorney’s failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities may 
be a ground for disciplining counsel . . . .”  Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 1998).  The Tobkin court stated that “an 
individual who files a complaint against an attorney and makes no public announcement of the com-
plaint, thereby allowing the grievance procedure to run its natural course, is afforded absolute immunity 
from a defamation action by the complained-against attorney.”  Id.  See also Wendy Evan Lehmann, 
Testimony Before or Communications to Private Professional Society’s Judicial Commission, Ethics 
Committee, or the Like, as Privileged, 9 A.L.R.4th § 4, at 807 (2004) (discussing communications with 
state bar associations or their committees). 
 129. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 74. 
 130. Id. at 76. 
 131. In 1992, the ABA McKay Report found that: 
Today . . . [most states] have eliminated duplicative procedures.  In over half the states, disci-
plinary hearings are public. Several national organizations exist, including the ABA Center 
for Professional Responsibility, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, 
and the National Organization of Bar Counsel. These groups formulate standards, conduct re-
search, present educational programs, compile statistics, and consult with disciplinary offi-
cials.  The ABA Center and the Bureau of National Affairs publish a comprehensive refer-
ence manual on professional responsibility.  The Center also operates a national data bank on 
disciplined lawyers.  In the two decades since the Clark Report, most states and the ABA 
have adopted most of its recommendations. 
MCKAY REPORT, supra note 27, intro.  The McKay Report added: 
At the local, state, and national levels, the profession has continually reviewed and improved 
lawyer disciplinary systems since the Clark Report. At the request of state bar associations 
and state high courts, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has evaluated 
more than thirty disciplinary agencies and made recommendations for improvement.  The 
Committee also provides technical and research assistance in drafting disciplinary rules.  The 
Committee=s ongoing evaluation program not only assists state high courts, it also provides 
the Committee with feedback and new ideas to improve ABA disciplinary policy.  Since the 
Clark Report, the Committee has formulated and proposed many significant improvements to 
ABA policy, including expungement of disciplinary records, trust account record-keeping 
rules, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and numerous technical improvements to 
the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. 
            This cooperation among local, state, and national bar associations and state high 
courts has resulted in constant improvement and refining of disciplinary procedures. 
Id.  See also Levin, supra note 22, at 3-5.  According to Professor Levin: 
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reads the list of recommendations made by the Clark Committee at the van-
tage point of thirty-five years, it is easy to see how so many of the things 
that the Clark Report had urged have become standard features of American 
lawyer disciplinary systems.132 
B.  Attention to Professionalism in Legal Education 
Before 1970, there were very few law school classes devoted solely to 
the subject of attorney ethics.133   As Justice Clark had noted, new lawyers 
of that era were often unprepared to meet the professional responsibility 
issues they would confront in practice.134 
The Clark Report omitted any assessment of the “adequacy of the law 
school courses”135 but called for an examination of that subject.136  The Re-
port also urged that there should be “[g]reater emphasis in law school . . . on 
the individual attorney=s responsibility to assist the profession=s effort to 
police itself by reporting instances of professional misconduct to the appro-
priate disciplinary agency . . . .”137 
Both before and after the Report was issued, Justice Clark personally 
argued for extensive reforms in legal education.138  He wrote: 
  
Since the Clark Report, . . . [s]tate courts have become more actively involved in lawyer dis-
cipline.  Most courts appoint members of disciplinary boards rather than rely on bar organiza-
tions for that function.  Lawyer discipline systems are better funded and more public than 
they used to be.  More complaints received by disciplinary agencies are investigated . . . .  
Many of the state discipline systems are better equipped to deal with the most common client 
complaints about lawyers—such as fee disputes and failures to communicate—that often 
were not formally addressed by lawyer discipline systems.  Although serious questions re-
main concerning whether the current state lawyer discipline systems are as effective as they 
could be, there is little question that these systems are better in certain respects than the sys-
tems studied by the Clark Commission. 
Id. 
 132. See Caviedes, supra note 24, at 197–98. The author states “[s]ince the release of the Clark 
Report, attorney disciplinary systems throughout the country have been modernized in an effort to re-
store public faith and maintain professional integrity. Many of the substantive and procedural changes 
that were made were modeled after standards promulgated by the ABA.”  Id. at 198. 
Cf. Devlin, supra note 48, at 926 (stating that “[w]ith some modifications, the Clark Report’s model 
disciplinary structure has remained the ABA model structure for lawyer discipline”). 
 133. Cf. Clark, supra note 21, at 254 (stating that “when I graduated [from the University of Texas 
law school] in 1922 . . . [e]thics lessons were taught in the courtroom and not in the classroom”). 
 134. Justice Clark attributed this fact to changes in the nature of lawyer preparation.  He wrote: 
In fifty years, we have gone from a profession trained largely through apprenticeship in of-
fices and courts to one almost entirely trained in schools.  The result is that new members of 
the bar lack any experience either in courtroom work or in exercising their sense of profes-
sional responsibility, which I look upon as indispensable to the true and faithful practitioner.  
The over-concentration of law schools on the case method affords students neither and has, 
therefore, come increasingly under attack. 
Id. at 255. 
 135. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at xv. 
 136. See id. at xv–xvi (calling for the creation of appropriate ABA committees that would operate in 
conjunction with the Association of American Law Schools and the National Conference of Bar Exam-
iners). 
 137. Id. at 167. 
 138. See, e.g., Tom C. Clark, Some Thoughts on Legal Education, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 125, 128 
(1963) (discussing the need to improve education in procedural law); see also Hon. John V. Tunney, Is 
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[T]o be successful, law schools must consciously undertake the one 
task that they have universally rejected: instilling normative values 
in their students. 
          Seemingly without exception, academicians have emphasized 
the impossibility of “teaching” integrity. . . . 
          Yet however difficult it may be for academic institutions to 
come to grips with the most basic sorts of human values such as 
honesty and a sense of fairness, it is precisely these basic principles 
which were so lacking in Watergate and which are so sorely needed 
in the world.  Our law schools, it seems to me, must shoulder the 
burden of Ateaching@ honesty because there is simply no one else to 
do the job.  The sad fact of the matter is that integrity is the sort of 
virtue that once was more or less reliably developed through the 
joint socializing influences of the church, the family, schools, and 
peer groups.  For a number of reasons, however, the first two con-
tributors to this process have drastically diminished in importance 
in this country, and no other force has arisen to take their place.  
The burden, therefore, has come to rest on our law schools, and it is 
one which they must shoulder alone and shoulder well, for the pro-
fession=s other tools cannot perform the task.139 
 
Justice Clark praised many aspects of legal education.140  However, 
with respect to ethics training, Justice Clark’s exasperation with academics 
was palpable.  Discussing the attendees at a 1968 ABA-sponsored sympo-
sium on Education in the Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer (known 
as ABoulder II@), he wrote: 
 
[S]ome allowed as how it was unlikely that commitment to profes-
sional norms and values can be learned in the course of professional 
training; others asserted ethics is not the responsibility of the law 
schools; still others assured their audiences that it is impossible to 
interest the lawyers in ethical rules.  Some pointed out that the law-
yer in practice often does not realize that an ethical question is pre-
sent while the more cynical suggested that there is no possible reso-
lution for most ethical questions anyway.  Much time was con-
  
the Bar Meeting Its Ethical Responsibilities?, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245, 247 (1975) (stating that, “[a]s 
Mr. Justice Clark points out, a major responsibility for . . . [instilling in lawyers ethical sensitivity] rests 
with the law schools”). 
 139. See Clark, supra note 21, at 252–53. 
 140. For example, Justice Clark wrote: 
Certainly, those who come to grips with the state of legal education today should heartily 
agree that the law schools are turning out the finest products in their history.  As I think back 
to forty years ago when I graduated in law, I shudder at the thought of my being turned loose 
on the public with a law license.  Today, the average graduate=s knowledge of substantive law 
is really amazing and a goodly per cent reach brilliance. 
Clark, supra note 138, at 127–28. 
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sumed by the battle over whether the regular curricula should be 
Apervaded@ by reference to professional ethics problems or, on the 
other hand, whether a specific, separate course must be utilized.  At 
the same time, the necessity for law schools to address themselves 
to public policy matters and local social concerns floated in and out 
of the discussions.  Sadly, Boulder II illustrates the tendency of 
academics to raise all possible problems and to resolve none of 
them . . . .  Law schools have been stalling on making the hard deci-
sions and mouthing little more than Aplatitudinous exhortations.”   
          What good is knowledge of the law when those who possess 
it are corruptible?141 
 
Justice Clark’s recommendation was clear: 
 
[L]et us examine the present courses on professional responsibility 
offered by the law schools, debate the merits of what is being of-
fered and buckle down long enough to produce a basic program of 
instruction; revise the offerings to meet any inadequacy that thus 
arises; and make professional responsibility a required course on the 
subject in every law school. . . .  As far as I am concerned, the exact 
subject matter of such a course should be at the sound discretion of 
each school or professor but, above all, it would have to come to 
grips with the need to instill integrity in each and every student, and 
not just give a superficial familiarity with the Code, its annotations 
and amendments. 
          In addition, common sense dictates a more pervasive ap-
proach to ethical issues in every course offered in the law school.  
Moreover, weekly informal, evening seminars at which a panel of 
active practitioners could be questioned . . . should be set up.142 
 
Justice Clark, a strong supporter of law school clinics143 at a time before 
they were a common feature in legal education,144 believed that clinical 
education had a special role to play in ethics education: 
  
 141. Clark, supra note 21, at 257–58. 
 142. Id. at 259. 
 143. See Tom C. Clark, The Continuing Challenge of Advocacy, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 243, 243–45 
(1977) [hereinafter Clark, The Continuing Challenge] (promoting the creation of clinical programs in 
law schools); Tom C. Clark, Judicial Reform:  A Symposium:  Introduction, 23 FLA. L. REV. 217, 218, 
220 (1971) [hereinafter Clark, Judicial Reform] (stating that law schools Ado not equip students to prac-
tice law@ and urging the abandonment of the three-year curriculum and the substitution of a two-year 
basic course followed by a one-year clinical course). 
 144. Justice Clark was enthusiastic about clinical legal education as far back as 1958, a time long 
before that view was fashionable.  He later wrote:   
As I proposed back in 1958 in a speech at the University of Texas, copies of which I mailed 
to the Deans of all of the law schools, training similar to that of the present limited student 
legal aid work can be easily spread throughout legal education.  I said there:  
“It was Dean Pound who proposed, back in 1952, ‘A New Role for the Law School’ in 
an article under that title appearing in the 38 A.B.A. Journal 637.  It appears to have 
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Student practice clinics can furnish students a meaningful experi-
ence in exercising their sense of professional responsibility and can 
give to a more formal course on legal ethics a content and efficacy 
not otherwise available.  And this is vital, for a legal ethics course is 
worthless if it doesn’t deal with the subject in a way that students 
can understand and identify with.  In this regard, law schools, it 
seems, have always been afflicted with an inadequate approach to 
legal ethics.145 
His proposal for clinical education was in no respect modest and, like 
his policy of hiring one law clerk each year from a non-elite school,146 was 
untraditional.  He wrote: 
[W]e must “beef-up” the clinical programs; make them compulsory; 
implement the teaching staff with practicing lawyers by court as-
signment if necessary; and enlist judges on a statewide basis and at 
all levels to head up clinical programs in their respective courts.  In 
addition to the trial techniques taught in these clinics, there should 
be constant discussion and examination of the problems of profes-
sional responsibility as they arise. . . .  Some will say . . . that such a 
detailed handling of the problems of professional responsibility is 
  
died for want of a second.  Belatedly, I would like to second the Dean’s proposal . . . . 
The problem of the transition from student to lawyer could be explored and a national 
program effected that would afford the student experience in the lawyer-client relation-
ship and in actual trial practice as well—a most needed enlargement of present legal 
education policy.” 
Clark, supra note 138, at 130; id. at 128 (discussing the desirability of affording advanced students 
courtroom experience).  See Tom C. Clark, Public Relations—the Bar and the Courts, 47 FLA. B.J. Feb. 
1973, at 88, 89 (urging that clinics be substituted for the third year of law school); Tom C. Clark, The 
Sixties—A Historic Decade in Judicial Improvement, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 331, 334 (1970) (arguing 
for more clinical courses). 
 145. See Clark, supra note 21, at 256 (stating that “I have dwelled on the subject of effective student 
clinics in this article on teaching professional responsibility because I believe that they go hand in 
hand”). 
 146. Justice Clark explained his practice in hiring law clerks in an article published shortly after he 
left the Supreme Court: 
[W]hen I was on the Court I had two law clerks. . . . I used to take one of my law clerks, for 
eighteen years, from the smaller law schools, the ones that had maybe one hundred to two 
hundred to three hundred students, because I thought that rather than taking both of them 
from the prestige schools, I might give the smaller law schools an opportunity to say, “We 
have a clerk on the Supreme Court.”  It was a very good tonic for them. 
           I found, incidentally, that the young men I obtained from the smaller schools did as 
good if not a better job in some instances than did the ones from the brand name schools, the 
prestige ones.  Indeed, I had one that came from a night school—a night school—who was 
one of the best clerks I ever had. . . .  It just goes to show you that these small law schools are 
still the backbone of our legal profession.  Don’t fool yourself on that! 
Clark, Address, supra note 52, at 362.  Like Justice Clark’s views on clinical education, his ideas about 
hiring Supreme Court law clerks were ahead of their time.  See Tony Mauro, Ivy League Schools Losing 
Ground? Supreme Court Law Clerks’ Alma Maters Increasingly Diverse, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 10, 
2003, at 6 (noting “A survey of this term’s 35 law clerks reveals that more and more of the clerks are 
from non-Ivy League schools. . . .  Fully 19 of the clerks . . . graduated from non-Ivy League law 
schools.”). 
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not the law school’s job, or it is too expensive, or it will absorb too 
much time from the rest of the curriculum.  My answer is this: if 
this be true, we must still make the most of it.  Let the third year be 
a combined clinical and professional responsibility year.147 
Much of what Justice Clark envisioned for legal education has come to 
pass.  At most law schools in the United States, students are now required to 
take a course devoted exclusively to the subject of attorney professional 
responsibility.148  These courses normally require law students to spend 
twenty or more classroom hours studying the types of ethical issues that 
attorneys confront in the practice of law.149  Law school Professional Re-
sponsibility courses typically must be completed and passed in order for a 
student to graduate.150  In addition, clinical legal education is now available 
to a significant number of law students.  In both the United States and other 
countries, clinical law courses give substantial attention to the ethical issues 
that lawyers confront in law practice.151 
C.  The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam 
A large majority of the American states152 now require law school 
graduates to pass a special examination on the law of attorney professional 
responsibility prior to being admitted to the practice of law.  The Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) is a standardized test with 
fifty questions, which change each time the exam is given.153  Students are 
given two hours and five minutes to complete the examination,154 and a 
student who fails to pass the exam cannot obtain a license in most states and 
therefore cannot practice law.  Up until the introduction of the MPRE in 
1980, “some states tested professional responsibility only minimally or not 
at all on their bar examinations and it was possible to gain admission to the 
  
 147. Clark, supra note 21, at 260. 
 148. See Levin, supra note 45, at 407 n.49 (stating that “[a]t present . . . at least two-thirds of all 
accredited law schools require students to take a professionalism or ethics course, although the number 
of credits vary”). 
  Naturally, with so many legal ethics classes now being taught, many law school professors now 
specialize in teaching the law of attorney professional responsibility.  See ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS., THE 
AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1310–17 (2002–03) (listing more than 900 law professors teach-
ing in the fields of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility). 
 149. Ordinarily, students must learn the rules of conduct that apply to lawyers and to judges.  Profes-
sional Responsibility classes examine the duties that a lawyer owes to clients, to courts, to other lawyers, 
and to the legal system.  The classes address the different roles that private practitioners, prosecutors, 
corporate counsel, and judges play in the American adversarial system of justice. 
 150. Levin, supra note 45, at 395. 
 151. Cf. Sue Bentch, Confidentiality, Corporate Counsel, and Competition Law: Representing Multi-
National Corporations in the European Union, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1003, 1004 (2004) (discussing issues 
confronted by a clinical professor teaching legal ethics as a Fulbright Scholar in Latvia). 
 152. Levin, supra note 45, at 395 (indicating that the MPRE is required in 47 states); NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE MPRE: 2004 INFORMATION BOOKLET 3 (2003) (stating that 
“[t]he MPRE is required for admission to practice law in most U.S. jurisdictions”). 
 153. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, supra note 152, at 31–32 (describing the exam). 
 154. Id. (stating the length of the exam). 
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bar without demonstrating awareness of any rules of professional responsi-
bility.”155 
The Clark Committee had hinted at the desirability of making ethics a 
bar examination subject.156  However, there is reason to question whether 
Justice Clark would have thought that a multiple-choice test on ethics was a 
good idea.  In an article on the future of the legal profession, he suggested 
that, ideally, “the bar examination as presently conducted157 would be abol-
ished and a more realistic test of the student’s ability to practice law would 
be devised.”158  Justice Clark’s writings159 also suggest that he was more 
interested in ethics as character-building160 than in ethics as knowledge of 
rules of conduct.161  Still, the MPRE, which many regard as “a step in the 
  
 155. Levin, supra note 45, at 399. 
 156. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at xv–xvii.  The Report stated: 
The adequacy of law school courses designed to promote pride in the profession and to ele-
vate ethical standards and the effectiveness of present procedures to screen applicants for ad-
mission to the bar are subjects of substantial dimensions and require a special expertise.  In 
view of the critical importance of these subjects to the maintenance of high standards in the 
profession, the Committee urges that consideration be given to the creation by the American 
Bar Association of appropriate committees, in conjunction with such interested organizations 
as the Association of American Law Schools and the National Conference of Bar Examiners, 
to survey these issues in depth. 
Id. 
 157. In 1974, the year Justice Clark wrote this statement, the Multistate Bar Examination on core 
legal subjects was just coming into use.  The MBE was first administered on February 23, 1972.  Robert 
M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 380 (1996) (stating 
date); id. at 379–80 (indicating that, since the beginning, the MBE has tested on Torts, Contracts, Prop-
erty, Criminal Law, and Evidence, and that Constitutional Law was added at a later date).  Today, “the 
MBE is administered in 48 states and the District of Columbia.”  SUZANNE DARROW-KLEINHAUS, THE 
BAR EXAM IN A NUTSHELL 133 (2003).  The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination did not 
come into use until 1980.  Levin, supra note 45, at 399 (stating the test was first introduced in 1980 Ain 
response to concerns about lawyers’ ethical conduct and the public’s perception of lawyers@).   In 1974, 
many states still relied, perhaps primarily, on essay questions to test bar applicants. 
 158. See Clark, Changing Times, supra note 73, at 4.  On a later occasion, Justice Clark urged that 
the third year of legal education should be an internship year and that students should be permitted to 
take the bar exam after completing 24 months of classroom training, with formal certification to practice 
law delayed until after completion of the internship.  See Clark, The Continuing Challenge, supra note 
143, at 246 (discussing development of practical lawyering skills). 
 159. Clark, supra note 21, at 259 (stating that we “need to instill integrity in each and every student, 
and not just give a superficial familiarity with the Code, its annotations and amendments”). 
 160. See Clark, Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 52, at 486 (noting that to remedy the poor 
image of the profession, “[w]e must tighten our disciplinary procedures, make them more effective and 
instill in every student who aspires to be a lawyer and every lawyer as well the moral and ethical stan-
dards that he must practice in the law”). 
 161. Justice Clark placed priority on character and virtues.  “Honesty and integrity,” he wrote, Amust 
be the hallmark—the guiding star—of every member of the bar.”  Id.  However, Justice Clark also 
championed disciplinary procedures through which professional ethics standards would be enforced as 
hard-edged rules as rules of law.  See Clark, supra note 21, at 259 (proposing “let us have strict en-
forcement of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with no if’s, and’s, or wherefore’s”).  These 
somewhat competing views placed him at an important crossroads in the development of the field of 
legal ethics. 
At the beginning of [the twentieth] century, the professional ethics of lawyers, judges, politi-
cians, and civil servants were largely personal matters.  In making difficult decisions, and in 
distinguishing right from wrong, these individuals relied primarily upon religious beliefs and 
social mores.  The process required moral reasoning about the common good.  Formal en-
forcement of ethical standards was neither a goal nor an issue; rather, the character of the ac-
tor was the public=s principal guarantee of good performance of professional duties.  More 
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right direction,”162 was the logical outgrowth of the reforms in legal educa-
tion that Justice Clark had urged.  The MPRE helps to ensure that what is 
taught in law school Professional Responsibility courses is focused and aca-
demically demanding.  The exam aims to guarantee that every lawyer at 
least has been introduced to the basic rules of professional conduct.  Noth-
ing was more natural than that calls for increased attention to ethics educa-
tion in law schools, such as Justice Clark’s, would be followed by a plan to 
test whether the changes in legal education were producing measurable re-
sults. 
D. Continuing Legal Education on Ethics 
The Clark Report urged continuing education programs to do a better 
job in impressing on attorneys their duty to report misconduct by other 
members of the profession.163  This was a matter about which Justice Clark 
felt strongly.  With respect to lawyers failing to assist the disciplinary sys-
tem, Justice Clark wrote, “[i]t is amazing that lawyers who are supposed to 
uphold and defend the law shrink away from performing their duties in this 
area.”164 
The Clark archives show that Justice Clark practiced what he preached.  
While chairing the ABA Special Committee, Justice Clark received a com-
plaint from a layperson about an attorney who allegedly acted unethically in 
  
importantly, the principles embodied in the nascent ethical codes for lawyers and doctors 
were typically not imposed upon unwilling practitioners with the force of law. 
            Today, however, the situation is considerably different. At the threshold of the new 
millennium, professional ethics in American public life is regulated heavily. The rules gov-
erning the conduct of lawyers, judges, and public servants are routinely codified in uniform 
terms and strictly enforced.  Several developments in American society have animated this 
shift from ethical standards based on individual character to standards based instead on le-
gally binding, uniform rules.  Although undoubtedly this change reflects the premium that 
Americans place on the rule of law and individual rights, three other forces have contributed 
greatly to this transformation:  the rise of consumerism, the power of the press, and the 
American preference for statutory solutions. 
Vincent R. Johnson, America=s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 746–
49 (1999). 
            The difference between character-based and rules-based approaches to legal ethics has resulted in 
something of a dichotomy in the teaching of professional responsibility in law schools.  Some law pro-
fessors focus on “the identification, transmission, and enforcement of uniform standards governing the 
conduct of lawyers,” whereas others study the choices lawyers make in real or fictional stories, such as 
lawyers depicted in biographies or literature.  See Vincent Robert Johnson, Law-Givers, Story-Tellers, 
and Dubin’s Legal Heroes:  The Emerging Dichotomy in Legal Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 
342–45 (1989) (discussing the two camps);  see also Johnson, supra note 15, at 25–29 (discussing dif-
ferent approaches to teaching professional responsibility). 
 162. Levin, supra note 45, at 399–412 (1998) (stating that “the MPRE was a step in the right direc-
tion of insuring that lawyers admitted to practice acquire some knowledge of basic professional respon-
sibility rules,” but that it should be reconsidered to determine whether it does enough to prepare lawyers 
for the professional responsibility challenges they will face in practice). 
 163. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 167 (recommending “[g]reater emphasis in . . . continu-
ing legal education courses on the individual attorney’s responsibility to assist the profession’s efforts to 
police itself by reporting instances of professional misconduct”). 
 164. Letter from (apparently) Tom C. Clark, U.S. J., to Orison S. Marden 2 (Feb. 2, 1968) (copy on 
file with the author). 
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connection with the settlement of a case and disbursement of funds.  That 
letter was immediately forwarded to the appropriate local grievance com-
mittee “[o]n behalf of Justice Clark . . . .”165 
Justice Clark personally envisioned that continuing legal education 
would not just reinforce the duty to report misconduct, but that it would 
play an important role in refocusing the legal profession on its tradition of 
public service.  He wrote: 
[W]e must . . . provide exhortation and instruction by the leaders of 
the bar to inspire acceptance of high ethical standards.  For exam-
ple, let us organize seminars on professional responsibility within 
the unified bars, with attendance compulsory.  In jurisdictions not 
having a unified bar, the seminars could be sponsored by the 
[s]upreme [c]ourt of the state, the ultimate authority on such mat-
ters.166 
Recent law school graduates and continuing legal education programs, Jus-
tice Clark believed, would spread an “ethical renaissance . . . across the 
land.”167 
During the past quarter-century, most American states have adopted 
continuing education requirements for lawyers.168  For example, in the State 
of Texas, every lawyer must take fifteen hours of additional instruction each 
year in order to remain licensed.169  In many states, some portion of the con-
tinuing legal education requirements must be devoted to legal ethics.  In 
Texas, three of the fifteen hours of instruction must focus on this subject.170  
This type of requirement has an important practical effect.  Virtually every 
continuing legal education program now contains one or more presentations 
devoted in whole or in part to ethical issues.171  Continuing legal education 
  
 165. Letter from David Hayes, Jr., Staff Assistant, ABA, to James I. Smith, III, Executive Director, 
Allegheny County Bar Ass’n (Dec. 18, 1967) (copy on file with the author) (pertaining to a client’s 
complaint that a lawyer had forced the client to accept a settlement and had failed to provide a proper 
accounting of the funds that were received).  The letter states: 
On behalf of Justice Clark, I am sending along to you Cullen E. McCoy=s letter dated Decem-
ber 10th, which complains of unethical and unprofessional conduct on the part of a Pittsburgh 
attorney.  I would be pleased if you could place Mr. McCoy’s letter in the hands of your 
Grievance Committee Chairman for such action as he deems appropriate. 
Id.  Interestingly, the letter was sent a mere eight days after the date of the letter informing Justice Clark 
of the alleged misconduct.  There was no delay. 
 166. Clark, supra note 21, at 259. 
 167. See id. at 252; see also Clark, Judicial Reform, supra note 143, at 222 (urging that “provision 
should be made for the continuing education of both the judge and his staff”). 
 168. See Harry J. Haynsworth, Post-Graduate Legal Education in the United States, 43 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 403, 403 (2002) (stating that “[t]hirty-nine states currently have what is known as a mandatory 
continuing legal education (‘MCLE’) requirement”). 
 169. TEX. STATE BAR RULES art. 12, § 6(a) (1998) (stating fifteen-hour requirement). 
 170. Id. at § 6(b) (stating three-hour requirement). 
 171. In continuing legal education programs, knowledge of basic rules of legal ethics is reinforced. 
Lawyers learn about new developments in the ethics field.  Advice is provided to help attorneys identify, 
avoid, and deal with ethical problems. 
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organizers commonly regard the availability of ethics credit as a factor that 
helps to increase attendance at programs for jurisdictions with an ethics 
requirement. 
Continuing education for lawyers in ethics is just one of the many ways 
that lawyers already admitted to practice are afforded access to information 
about their professional responsibilities.  Today, lawyer magazines often 
contain an Aethics@ column.172  In many states, attorneys can obtain free ad-
vice by telephone about ethical questions.  For example, in Texas, an ethics 
expert is employed by the bar association to answer questions by telephone 
from any lawyer in the state.173  The American Bar Association offers a 
similar free service.174 
As was true long before the Clark Report, in all states it is also possible 
for lawyers to obtain a free written ethics opinion addressing an area of par-
ticular concern.175  A recent variation on the old theme is that, in some 
states, a lawyer may submit for pre-approval a proposed advertisement for 
legal services.176  In Texas, prior approval of an ad is usually binding in a 
subsequent disciplinary proceeding.177  This process, like continuing legal 
  
  Brochures for continuing legal education programs commonly state both the number of CLE 
hours that can be earned at the program and the portion of the total hours that count toward the ethics 
requirement.  For example, a flyer might state, “Earn six hours of CLE credit (including 1.5 hours of 
ethics credit).” 
 172. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Thompson, Ethics:  The Real Deal-Breakers, 90 A.B.A. J., Aug. 2004, at 
26 (discussing lawyers’ operation of ancillary businesses). 
 173. In the State Bar of Texas website (www.texasbar.com), information can be found under the 
topic of “Client Assistance and Grievance,” under the “Chief Disciplinary Counsel” link.  At 
http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel&Template=/TaggedPage/
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=25&ContentID=3305 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 174. Information can be located at www.abanet.org, under the category of ALegal Ethics, by select-
ing “ETHICSearch.”  At http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethicsearch/home.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 175. Opinions are often published so that other lawyers can also benefit from the guidance.  For 
example, the Texas Bar Journal, which is distributed monthly to the more than 70,000 members of the 
State Bar of Texas, includes an Ethics Opinion(s) section in months when one or more opinions have 
been issued.  See, e.g., Ethics Opinions, 65 TEX. BAR J. 555 (2002) (containing the text of multiple 
opinions).  A lawyer who relies on an advisory ethics opinion and acts in conformance with the views 
expressed normally will not be charged with improper conduct.  See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 67 
(stating that “a lawyer who has acted in accordance with a recent ethics committee recommendation is 
ordinarily given the benefit of the doubt in disciplinary proceedings”). 
 176. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.07 (Vernon 2005).  Rule 7.07 provides 
in part: 
(c) A lawyer who desires to secure an advance advisory opinion concerning compliance of a 
contemplated written solicitation communication or advertisement may submit to the Lawyer 
Advertisement and Solicitation Review Committee, not less than thirty (30) days prior to the 
date of first dissemination, the material specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of this Rule, includ-
ing the required fee . . . . 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.07(c) (Vernon 2005). 
 177. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.07 (Vernon 2005).  Subsection (c) 
states in part: 
An advisory opinion of the Lawyer Advertisement and Solicitation Review Committee of 
noncompliance is not binding in a disciplinary proceeding or disciplinary action but a finding 
of compliance is binding in favor of the submitting lawyer if the representations, statements, 
materials, facts and written assurances received in connection therewith are true and are not 
misleading.  The finding constitutes admissible evidence if offered by a party. 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.07(c) (Vernon 2005). 
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education programs, provides useful information to attorneys about whether 
their conduct complies with their ethical obligations. 
E.  Malpractice Actions, Fee Forfeiture, and Litigation Sanctions 
The rules of attorney ethics are enforced today not only through disci-
plinary proceedings but also in civil lawsuits against attorneys who violate 
the rules.  In lawsuits called malpractice actions, plaintiffs (typically former 
clients) seek to recover money damages from attorneys who caused them 
harm.178  The risk of malpractice liability is a major concern in modern 
American law practice.179 
A violation of ethical obligations also sometimes means that a lawyer 
will be barred from collecting or retaining attorney’s fees, either in whole or 
in part.180  For this to occur, the violation usually must involve a serious 
breach of the duty of loyalty to the client.181  Fee forfeiture (sometimes 
called disgorgement) is an increasingly important claim in civil litigation.182 
In addition, in all American states, a large body of law has emerged re-
cently which penalizes attorneys and their clients for frivolous litigation.183  
These rules give meaning to the general ethical precept that “[a] lawyer 
  
 178. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 4.1 (3d ed. 
2001) (discussing malpractice actions generally).  If a lawyer’s unethical conduct injures a client, there is 
a fair chance that the lawyer can be sued successfully.  Malpractice actions are not common, but they are 
also not rare.  See Gary N. Schumann & Scott B. Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal Malpractice 
Litigation: Predictions, Analysis, and Proposals for Change, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 146–47 (1998) 
(stating “in the past decade, there has been a definite and significant increase in legal malpractice claims 
throughout the United States, although such trends vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction”). 
  Some lawyers will never be sued by a client for malpractice, but others will be sued once or 
more during their careers.  If the client has been seriously harmed, an amount of money, sometimes 
substantial in amount, may be awarded to compensate the client. 
 179. See Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in Texas Legal 
Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 607, 607 (2002) (stating that the nature of malpractice claims has 
“changed dramatically and the potential for attorney liability has increased as a result”); Susan Saab 
Fortney & Jett Hanna, Fortifying a Law Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure:  Avoiding Legal Malpractice 
Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 672 (2002) (stating that “risk manage-
ment experts have recommended the adoption of policies and procedures to avoid conflicts of interest”).   
 180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000).  Section 37 pro-
vides: 
A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be required to forfeit 
some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter.  Considerations relevant to the ques-
tion of forfeiture include the gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on 
the value of the lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, 
and the adequacy of other remedies. 
Id.  If the fee has not yet been paid, the court can refuse to allow the attorney to collect the fee.  Or, if the 
client has already paid for legal services, a court may order the attorney to return to the client all or part 
of the money.  See also Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (holding that a client need not 
prove actual damages to obtain forfeiture of an attorney's fee due to the attorney's breach of a duty to the 
client). 
 181. See, e.g., Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 240 (stating that “an attorney's compensation is for loyalty as 
well as services, and his failure to provide either impairs his right to compensation”). 
 182. See McConnico & Bigelow, supra note 179, at 625–35 (discussing fee forfeiture claims). 
 183. See Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 909, 909 (2001) (charting recent developments in state legislatures and in Congress 
regarding frivolous litigation). 
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should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to har-
ass or intimidate others.”184  Under frivolous-litigation rules, an attorney or 
client can be held responsible for costs incurred by an opponent in defend-
ing against a meritless claim.185  
At the time of the Clark Report, malpractice actions against lawyers, 
forfeiture of attorney’s fees, and frivolous-litigation sanctions were quite 
unusual.  Today, they are much more common.  Lawyer discipline and legal 
malpractice actions are the chief mechanisms for enforcing ethics rules, but 
fee forfeiture and frivolous-litigation penalties play important, albeit 
smaller, roles.  It seems likely that the increased visibility of ethics issues 
generated by the Clark Report was a contributing factor in clients seeking 
avenues other than discipline to enforce the ethical obligations of attorneys.  
The Clark Report’s candid acknowledgment of the existence of lawyer mis-
conduct probably also made lawyers more willing to see the deficiencies of 
other attorneys and, thus, more ready to represent clients who had been 
harmed by other counsel.186  The Report probably encouraged judges to be 
more sympathetic to the plight of malpractice clients and to shape proce-
dural and substantive doctrine so that it would be more responsive to the 
victims of unethical conduct.187  It is reasonable to conclude that the Clark 
Committee’s efforts to improve lawyer disciplinary systems encouraged 
parallel developments in the other regimes that are used to address unethical 
conduct. 
It is also likely that the increased attention to ethics education in law 
schools, which Justice Clark promoted,188 emboldened law professors to 
serve as expert witnesses on legal ethics in malpractice actions and encour-
aged newly minted lawyers to seek to apply the ethics rules in fee-
generating forms of civil litigation.  Justice Clark would have appreciated 
that linkage, for he understood how attention in legal education was related 
to developments in law practice.  He had remarked in another context that 
the failure of law schools to treat criminal law as an important subject had 
caused too few lawyers to carve out a career in that field.189 
  
 184. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. (2003). 
 185. See Tessa M. Thrasher, Rule 11 Sanctions for Frivolous Pleadings:  When Can the Client Be 
Sanctioned, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 345, 345 (1992) (stating that “[u]nder the new Rule 11, represented 
parties as well as their attorneys can face sanctions if they file frivolous pleadings”). 
 186. ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A 
NUTSHELL 82 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that “[a]ttorneys are becoming less reluctant to represent clients or 
to testify as experts in malpractice actions”). 
 187. Id.  The authors state that “judicial attitudes are becoming more liberal toward acknowledging 
professional misconduct and incompetence:  Expanding time limits for bringing claims, allowing new 
theories of recovery, and eliminating the requirement of privity for third party actions in some cases, all 
exemplify this liberalization.” Id. 
 188. See section III-B infra. 
 189. See Clark, supra note 138, at 132.  Justice Clark wrote: 
As my Brother Brennan has so well said: 
“Certainly the law schools do not turn out droves of bright young men anxious to carve 
out a career in criminal law—at least for the defense. . . .  [I]f the law schools, and par-
ticularly the major ones, give only cursory attention to the criminal law in the curricu-
lum, it is hard to see how students can be blamed for coming away from the law school 
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F.  Revision of Ethics Codes  
In the United States, each state has its own rules of attorney conduct, 
and virtually every jurisdiction has significantly revised its ethics code 
twice or more during the past thirty-five years.190  Indeed, it would be fair to 
say that the reform of ethics rules has become an apparently permanent fea-
ture of the American legal profession.191  At any moment, it seems that ei-
ther the American Bar Association is drafting a new model, States are de-
ciding whether to implement the new model, or amendments are being pro-
posed to make changes to either the ABA model or state variations.  The 
process never ends.  In Texas, for example, there is a permanent committee 
of the state bar that continuously reviews proposals for reform.192   
Debates over the content of attorney ethics rules were not always so 
common.  As recently as the end of the 1960s, there was not much interest 
in these issues.  This is illustrated by another ABA development in the field 
of legal ethics which paralleled the work of the Clark Committee, the draft-
ing and passage in 1969 of a new model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.  The Code, which replaced the sixty-one-year old Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics,193 was quickly adopted nationwide,194 probably because issues 
relating to attorney conduct were much less visible within the legal profes-
sion.  The result was a happy uniformity of ethics rules across the coun-
try.195  That blissful state of uniformity no longer exists.196  Although 
  
with the feeling that perhaps the institution also shares the unfortunate tendency of the 
community to disapprove of lawyers who undertake the defense of people charged with 
crime.”  
Id. 
 190. In most states, major reforms follow the adoption of a new or substantially revised ABA model 
code.  As explained in the text, infra, the last three major ABA revisions occurred in 1969, 1983, and 
2002. 
 191. Ethics reform is a ceaseless task, in part because new issues arise as the nature of law practice 
changes.  Views also evolve as to the correct prioritization of conflicting values.  For example, since the 
late 1960s, the ABA and the states have been seriously conflicted over whether to rank the confidential-
ity of client information more highly than other competing interests, such as prevention of harm to the 
public or truthfulness to tribunals.  As a result, these and other issues of substantive law have been hotly 
debated, and the rules in some areas have changed frequently, and sometimes dramatically.  See Jesselyn 
Radack, The Government Attorney-Whistleblower and the Rule of Confidentiality:  Compatible at Last, 
17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 128–30 (2003) (discussing the history of the duty of confidentiality). 
 192. The committee is the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.  Its purpose is “[t]o 
evaluate the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and make suggestions to the Board of 
Directors of the State Bar concerning revisions that may be appropriate.”  At  
http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Committees&CONTENTID=10259&TEMPLATE=/C
ontentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 193. See Wright, supra note 43, at 757 (stating point).   
 194. See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 56 (stating that “the 1969 Code was an impressive and quick 
success”).   
 195. See id. at 57 (stating that “[t]he Code was adopted in the great majority of states by the supreme 
court under the court’s inherent and exclusive power to regulate the legal profession”). 
 196. See Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and 
Associates:  Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988).  The article 
states: 
At the risk of oversimplification, it is probably fair to state that the profession has moved 
from a point, in the early 1970s, when rules of ethics were largely uniform from one jurisdic-
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quickly adopted by the States, the 1969 Code soon proved to be controver-
sial once the Clark Report and the Watergate crisis focused a spotlight on 
the legal profession.  There were proposed “amendments to the Code every 
year between 1974 and 1980 . . . .”197  The Code was eventually replaced by 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983,198 and the Model 
Rules were extensively revised in 2002.199   
Proposed changes in ethics rules, at least since the mid- and late-1970s, 
have been flashpoints of controversy, because issues of legal ethics are 
much more prominent throughout the profession due to developments such 
as the issuance of the Clark Report, which brought issues of attorney con-
duct to the forefront.  As a result of extensive discussion, debate, and revi-
sion during state-level adoption, state ethics codes frequently vary from the 
ABA model and from one another in addressing difficult issues on which 
reasonable minds can differ. 
Justice Clark recognized the important connection between substantive 
ethics rules and mechanisms for enforcement.  While the Clark Committee 
was in the process of evaluating lawyer discipline, it was also in communi-
cation with the Wright Committee (officially known as the ABA Special 
Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards), which was drafting the 
new Code of Professional Responsibility.200  A designated member of the 
Clark Committee regularly attended meetings related to the new lawyers’ 
code and offered comments relating to the process.201  Information about the 
work of the Wright Committee was then reported back to the Clark Com-
  
tion to the next, to a point where today there is less harmony and greater diversity as to the 
norms of professional conduct. 
Id. 
 197. WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 57.   
 198. Id. at 62. 
 199. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Foreword, Symposium—Ethics 2000 and Beyond:  Reform or Profes-
sional Responsibility as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (discussing the “Ethics 2000” reforms 
that were approved by the ABA in 2002). 
 200. See, e.g., Letter from David Hayes, Jr., Assistant Director of Committee Services, ABA, to Fred 
B. Hulse and John G. Bonomi (both members of the Clark Committee) (Sept. 22, 1967) (copy on file 
with the author) (indicating that Professor John Sutton said that the “Evaluation Committee is most 
interested in talking to representatives of our Committee to explain and review their work up to date”); 
Letter from David Hayes, Jr., Assistant Director, Committee Services, ABA, to Professor John Sutton, 
University of Texas (Oct. 2, 1967) (copy on file with the author) (discussing meeting); Letter from 
(apparently) Alice L. O’Donnell, Justice Clark’s secretary, to David Hayes, Jr., ABA (Jan. 4, 1968) 
(copy on file with the author).  The letter states “I asked Mr. Justice Clark about the Ethics Committee 
which Mr. Edw. Wright heads, and he agrees that we should at least have a representative of the Disci-
pline Committee there.” Id. 
 201. See Letter from David Hayes, Jr., Assistant Director, Committee Services, ABA, to Alice 
O’Donnell (Justice Clark’s secretary) (Jan. 2, 1968) (copy on file with the author) (stating “Ed Wright’s 
Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards, as you know, is interested in having a representative 
of our Committee attend their meetings”).  The letter further stated: “John Bonomi attended their meet-
ing here in Chicago in November and reports from Ed Wright indicate that they were very pleased to 
have him and his observations and comments were very well received.”  Id.; see also Memorandum from 
John G. Bonomi (a member of the Clark Committee), to the Special Committee on Disciplinary En-
forcement (Jan. 15, 1968) (copy on file with the author) (discussing three meetings of the Wright Com-
mittee that he attended and several more that he intended to attend, and summarizing concerns he ex-
pressed to the Committee). 
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mittee.202  Justice Clark was interested in promoting communication be-
tween the two bodies.203 
Shortly following the issuance of the Clark Report, there were also ef-
forts to adopt standards governing judicial conduct.  Justice Clark supported 
those initiatives.  He wrote: 
While I verily believe that one who is elevated to judicial office is 
usually grounded in the fundamental precepts of good judicial con-
duct and needs no reminder of what is right and what is wrong; 
nevertheless, I urge the adoption by the courts—both federal and 
state—of a clear and concise statement of the permissible bounds of 
judicial conduct.  The principles embodied in such a code would aid 
in the recovery of public respect and confidence in the court that is 
so necessary in a stable society.204 
Undoubtedly, the efforts to draft and then later reform American attor-
ney codes and judicial codes have brought increased attention to issues of 
professional responsibility, such as the effectiveness of disciplinary mecha-
nisms.  Similarly, the attention focused on unethical attorney conduct and 
poor enforcement of existing rules by the Clark Committee spurred the ef-
forts of those who seek to write and revise the content of attorney conduct 
law.  These two developments—revision of substantive ethics laws and ref-
ormation of ethics enforcement mechanisms—are mutually reinforcing and 
have contributed substantially to the transformation of the field of legal eth-
ics. 
G.  Abundant Ethics Materials and News Coverage   
The increased importance of legal ethics, both as a law school subject 
and in law practice, has given rise to a wealth of scholarship.205  As was not 
  
 202. See Resume Minutes, supra note 19, at 4 (copy on file with the author).  The minutes state: 
Mr. Bonomi [a member of the Clark Committee] reported that he had met with [the ABA 
Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards] on October 7, 1967.  He reviewed 
generally the concept of the work of that Committee and reported on the practical problems 
that Committee is having and will have in drafting disciplinary rules to enforce the revised 
canons.  He also pointed out the problems the Committee will have when it asks some 10,000 
lawyers to comment on the draft of the revised canons, as it currently plans to do. 
Id. 
 203. See id. (copy on file with the author) (stating that “Justice Clark suggested that our Committee 
members attend meetings of the Evaluation of Ethics Committee”). 
 204. Tom C. Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation—Its Potential, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42 
(1970).  Justice Clark added: 
I am hopeful that before too long the ABA will approve and promulgate its final draft of 
Standards of Judicial Conduct and the courts—federal and state—will follow with speed in 
the adoption of clear and concise canons of judicial deportment based thereon, together with 
practical and effective procedures for their enforcement. 
Id. at 42. 
 205. See Vincent R. Johnson, Celluloid Legal Ethics:  Discipline Redux, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
745, 745 (1990) (discussing the proliferation of texts, monographs and treatises). 
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true prior to the Clark Report, there are now many books on legal and judi-
cial ethics.206  
The Clark Report had called for public dissemination of information 
about the disciplinary process.  The Committee focused on the problem of 
“[f]ailure to publish the achievements of disciplinary agencies.”207  It found 
that “[m]ost disciplinary agencies deliberately discourage any publication of 
information concerning their activities, believing that the public image of 
the profession is damaged by a disclosure that attorney misconduct ex-
ists.”208  The Committee realistically concluded: 
Efforts to foster public acceptance of a myth that there is no mis-
conduct in the profession are not only useless but may expose the 
profession to ridicule as well. The route to encouraging public con-
fidence in the disciplinary process lies in acknowledging the exis-
tence of attorney misconduct and showing the public the steps taken 
against it.209 
The Clark Report stated: 
Arrangements should be made to have relevant information con-
cerning attorney discipline published in media likely to reach mem-
bers of the profession and the public, including law journals, bar 
journals or newsletters and local newspapers of general circula-
tion.210 
Today, ethics issues often receive extensive coverage in legal newspa-
pers, which was not true at the time of the Clark Report.   Such newspapers 
report on who has been sued for malpractice,211 who has been disciplined,212 
  
 206. For example, as the result of work throughout the 1990s, the American Law Institute has issued 
a new comprehensive guide to lawyer duties called the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers, which is an important landmark in this field of law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).  There is also a wide selection of written and video materials available 
for use in ethics education programs.  See Johnson, supra note 205, at 745–46 (discussing video re-
sources).  Various law schools now sponsor conferences focused on legal malpractice and attorney 
professional responsibility, which publish symposium issues in law journals.  See Adam Boland, Fore-
word, The Second Annual Symposium on Legal Malpractice & Professional Responsibility, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 733 (2003) (discussing annual symposium on legal ethics). 
 207. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 143. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 145.  The Report said with approval: 
The secretary of a state bar association noted that the deterrent effect inherent in every disci-
plinary proceeding is directly proportionate to the number of practicing attorneys who are 
made aware of its existence . . . . 
             Similarly, the very effectiveness of discipline in a particular case [such as disbarment 
or suspension] may depend on widespread awareness that it has been imposed. 
Id. at 144. 
 211. See, e.g., Verdicts and Settlements, NAT=L L.J., July 12, 2004, at 20 (reporting that a malpractice 
suit against a law firm yielded a $4.4 million award); Verdicts and Settlements, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 29, 
2004, at 15 (reporting a suit where a lawyer allowed the case to lapse after taking a retainer fee). 
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and other charges of misconduct.213  Similarly, the public media readily 
recount the shortcomings of lawyers and the actions that are or should be 
taken to address those failings.214  These steps, along with the evolving 
wealth of literature on legal and judicial ethics, provide useful information 
to members of the profession and the public and are consistent with the 
spirit of the Clark Report.215 
H.  Attention to Lawyers with Disabilities 
Today, all states have a lawyer assistance program to provide counsel-
ing, mentoring, and other forms of support to attorneys with drug and alco-
hol problems.216  State rules also commonly provide for attorneys to be sus-
pended from the practice of law during periods of disability.217 
The Clark Report had called for the temporary suspension from practice 
of those afflicted with disability.  The Committee wrote: 
          Many states have no provisions for coping with the problem 
of the attorney who is disabled by reason of mental illness or addic-
tion to intoxicants or drugs but whose infirmity has not resulted in 
misconduct.  The absence of such a procedure exposes the public to 
serious danger, for it prohibits any action against the lawyer known 
to be disabled before his disability has led to harm to his clients.  
What rationale can the profession provide for its failure to authorize 
the suspension of a lawyer who is involuntarily committed to a 
mental hospital . . . .218 
The Clark Committee had recommended state adoption of “[a] court 
rule authorizing indefinite suspension or transfer to inactive status of any 
attorney incapacitated by mental illness, senility or addiction to drugs or 
intoxicants until such time as the incapacity no longer exists.”219  The 
  
 212. See, e.g., Discipline, TEX. LAW., Feb. 2, 2004, at 100, available at WL 2/2/2004 TEXLAW 
CS1117 (Discipline; 5th United States Circuit Court of Appeals—John Dalton Chappelle [Grievance 
Committee 6A, Nos. D0010218078 & D0010218080]).  
 213. See, e.g., Mary Alice Robbins, Jenkens Sues Two Attorneys, TEX. LAW., July 12, 2004, at 1, 
available at WL 7/12/2004 TEXLAW 1 (discussing a law firm=s action to enjoin lawyers from commit-
ting alleged violations of the law, including breach of the ethics rules on confidentiality). 
 214. Pitt Says Lawyers Will Be Held Accountable to Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at C2 
(calling for lawyers to be held accountable for failure to report S.E.C. violations); Henry Weinstein, A 
Sleeping Lawyer and a Ticket to Death Row, L.A. Times (Valley Edition), July 15, 2000, at A1 (discuss-
ing a capital punishment case in which the defense attorney was caught asleep during trial). 
 215. Note, however, that the Clark Report recommended that in most cases the pendency of an 
unresolved disciplinary charge should “be kept confidential until hearings have been held and the 
charges sustained by the trial authority.”  CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 138. 
 216. See Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers: Are We Ready to Address the De-
nial?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265 (1997) (discussing lawyer assistance programs or similar committees 
in all 50 states).  
 217. SCHUWERK & HARDWICK, supra note 125, app. C at 1496 (quoting Texas rules). 
 218. CLARK REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
 219. Id. at 110. 
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Committee also hinted that creation of support mechanisms to assist those 
with substance abuse problems might be appropriate.  The Committee had 
found that “the profession’s delay in meeting the problem of the incapaci-
tated attorney has been its reluctance to deprive brother attorneys, who often 
have no independent income or pension, of their means of earning a liveli-
hood.”220 
The Clark Committee rejected the priority of that consideration.  How-
ever, the Report stated: 
          That is not to say that the profession should concern itself 
only with removing the disabled attorney and should ignore the 
economic plight that may follow.  To the contrary, a profession 
whose sense of responsibility prompts it to create security funds to 
reimburse those victimized by its members might well create a 
similar fund to protect those of its members who fall victim to ill-
ness.221 
Justice Clark had personally expressed great concern for those who used 
drugs.  In an article published after stepping down from the Supreme Court, 
which today seems wholly extraordinary, Justice Clark spoke about the 
“badge of criminality” that a conviction for marijuana use placed on “thou-
sands and thousands of our children” and called for the repeal of marijuana 
laws.222 
IV.  FOCUS THE ATTENTION OF THE PROFESSION ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
The Clark Report was a brilliant document.  Clear-eyed, courageous, 
and prescient, it charted a course of reform and stirred a debate on attorney 
ethics that continues to resound throughout the legal profession.  The issu-
ance of the Report was a pivotal moment in the development of the Ameri-
can bar and in the field of legal ethics.  Had Justice Clark not brought to the 
Committee his reputation,223 good judgment, agreeable temperament,224 and 
visibility, the Report might well have languished, as many reports do, and 
great opportunities might have been lost.  Justice Clark’s leadership of the 
  
 220. Id. at 111. 
 221. Id. at 112. 
 222. See Tom C. Clark, Drugs and the Law, 18 Loyola L. Rev. 243, 246–47 (1972).  Justice Clark 
wrote, “[n]ot only have the experts found that marijuana does not incite crime but they have declared 
that ‘both Eastern and Western literature contain little evidence at this time that light to moderate use of 
cannabis (marijuana) has deleterious physical effects. . . .’”  Id. at 246 (quoting U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, 
EDUC., & WELFARE, THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 229 (1972)).  
 223. See Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985 (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger as stating of 
Clark that “no one had such universal esteem of the lawyers and judges in this country”). 
 224. See Temple, supra note 1, at 274 (stating that Justice Clark was Athe sweetest and most thought-
ful man I have ever known@). 
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reform effort was broadly welcomed,225 for he was a man who was not only 
passionate about the legal profession226 but described by friends and col-
leagues as “genuinely warmhearted,”227 “constantly solicitous of the wel-
fare” of others,228 “unfailingly cheerful, optimistic, and generous,”229 “self-
less,”230 and “open-minded.”231  Justice Lewis F. Powell, a former president 
of the American Bar Association, said, “[i]t is likely that Mr. Justice Clark 
was known personally and admired by more lawyers, law professors, and 
judges than any [J]ustice in the history of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”232 
The goodwill that Justice Clark had accumulated during years of public 
service was an asset to the project,233 as was his ability to define a clear 
course of action.   
Balanced with Clark’s extraordinary gentleness and considerateness 
[was] his equally extraordinary directness and incisiveness . . . .  
[T]his is the hand of iron in the very velvet glove. . . .  If there were 
alternate points of view and he had to offend someone by taking a 
side, he took sides.  He was an ambassador of good will only when 
it did not interfere with being an ambassador of improved judicial 
administration.234 
  
 225. Cf. Statement by Orison S. Marden, Last Retiring President of the ABA, at the First Public 
Hearing of the Special Committee on Disciplinary Enforcement of the ABA, Held at the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, Mar. 8, 1968 (draft Feb. 7, 1968), at 4 (copy on file with the author).  
The statement says: 
             Promptly on learning of the retirement plans of Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark I waited 
upon his doorstep, hat in hand, in the hope of persuading him to assume the directorship of 
this important work.  It was grossly unfair to ask this of Justice Clark as he had given so 
much of his time and energy over the past decade to the work of the organized bar but I over-
came the pangs of conscience and made the request.  Needless to say, his acceptance filled 
me with joy and gratitude and I know that lawyers all over the country share these senti-
ments. 
Id. 
 226. See Clark, Address, supra note 52, at 369 (quoting Justice Clark as stating that “‘Old Tom’ . . . 
is getting old—sixty-eight last week—but he is still young in heart and he still loves the lawyers”). 
 227. Donald Turner, Mr. Justice Clark:  A Personal Note, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 3, 3 (1967) (stating, as a 
former clerk, that “Mr. Justice Clark is indeed one of the most genuinely warmhearted persons I have 
ever known”). 
 228. Id. at 3 (stating that Justice Clark was “constantly solicitous of the welfare of those who worked 
with him even to the point of insisting that we take more holidays than we really thought that we 
should”). 
 229. Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985 (quoting Justice Byron White). 
 230. Id.  (quoting Justice John Paul Stevens referring to Justice Clark’s “selfless dedication to the 
administration of justice,” which earned the “respect, admiration, and affection of the entire federal 
judiciary”). 
 231. Turner, supra note 227, at 3 (describing Justice Clark as “[o]pen-minded, far more dispassion-
ate than most men can be, [and] willing to re-examine positions earlier taken”). 
 232. Justice Clark Dies, supra note 3, at 985. 
 233. See Letter from John G. Bonomi, Special Committee member, to Tom C. Clark (Mar. 28, 1968) 
(copy on file with the author) (stating that the good attendance by “so many distinguished members of 
the judiciary and bar” at the New York regional meeting was “directly attributable to the great reservoir 
of respect and good will that you have accumulated over the years”). 
 234. Frank, supra note 7, at 37–38. 
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Who better to persuade the legal profession to take on the hornets’ nest of 
reforming lawyer discipline than Justice Clark—a man gentle but coura-
geous?235 
The “deplorable”236 state of affairs that Justice Clark condemned in the 
1970s no longer exists.  Attorneys who violate the rules of ethics are regu-
larly held accountable in disciplinary actions.  Through increased funding 
and professional prosecution, American disciplinary systems have moved 
very substantially toward that goal. 
There have also been great improvements in the teaching of legal ethics, 
in protecting clients through civil remedies, and in promoting the fair and 
efficient functioning of the justice system, where ethics rules play an in-
creasingly larger role.  It is fair to credit the Clark Committee, the Clark 
Report, and Justice Clark himself for setting the profession on this produc-
tive course of development. 
It seems likely that Justice Clark would be pleased with many of the de-
velopments in the field of legal ethics since the issuance of the Clark Re-
port.  He argued that “we must focus the attention of the profession on ethi-
cal behavior and convince them of the necessity to adopt such standards in 
their daily lives.”237  There is no question that the attention of the profession 
is now focused on issues of attorney professional responsibility. 
 
  
 235. ABA President Marden was well aware of the significance of getting Justice Clark to head the 
reform effort.   See Letter from Orison S. Marden, President, ABA, to Hon. Thomas C. Clark, Associate 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Mar. 28, 1967 (copy on file with the author).  Marden wrote 
to Justice Clark: “We are overjoyed by your acceptance of the Chairmanship of our Special Committee 
on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement.  I know that your leadership will get us off to a good start in 
the vitally important undertaking.”  Id. at 1. 
 236. See Clark, supra note 21, at 252.  Justice Clark expressed his views in unequivocal terms that 
“[t]here is no doubt in my mind that the present state of our disciplinary machinery is deplorable and that 
we must perfect the professional system of disciplining and weeding out judges and lawyers who are 
inept, lazy, corrupt or dishonest.”  Id. 
 237. See Clark, supra note 21, at 258–59. 
